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"Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any
price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any
foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty."
-President John F. Kennedy
January 20, 19611
From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terror-
ism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime .... I will not
forget this wound to our country and those who inflicted it. I will not yield; I
will not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security
for the American people.
- President George W. Bush
September 20, 20012
INTRODUCTION
These words by Presidents Kennedy and Bush are separated by
four decades of international history, conflict, and political transfor-
mation. However, their purpose is the same: to prepare the United
States for long periods of global battle. But unlike the Cold War,3 the
"War on Terrorism ' 4 is not directed against an easily identifiable and
I John Fitzgerald Kennedy, Inaugural Address (1961), rernted in INAUGURAL AD-
DRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON 1789 TO
RICHARD MILHOUS NIXON 1969, at 268 (1969).
2 President's Address to Joint Session of Congress, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1347, 1349, 1351 (Sept. 20, 2001).
3 The Cold War period lasted from the mid-1940s (starting after the Second World
War) until the end of the 1980s (with the collapse of the Soviet Union). See Cold War in 3
THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 444 (15th ed. 1994).
4 Under the "Frequently Asked Questions" heading on the White House website, the
Bush Administration defines the "War on Terrorism" as follows:
What is the War on Terrorism?
Nineteen terrorists hijacked four commercial airplanes on September 11,
2001 and crashed two of the planes into the twin towers of the World Trade
Center in New York City, and one into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. A
fourth plane crashed in Pennsylvania. As a result, thousands of innocent
individuals from more than 80 nations lost their lives.
The evening of Sept. 11, President Bush spoke to the American people
from the Oval Office in a nationally televised address:
"The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge
structures collapsing, have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness, and a
quiet, unyielding anger. These acts of mass murder were intended to
frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed; our coun-
try is strong.
"A great people has been moved to defend a great nation. Terrorist
attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot
touch the foundation of America. These acts shattered steel, but they can-
not dent the steel of American resolve.
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locatable enemy.5 Rather, the United States now finds itself in the
unenviable position of swinging mightily at hidden bands of loosely
connected international terrorist networks, and at even smaller indi-
vidual terrorist cells in locations worldwide. 6
"America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon
for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light
from shining."
These terrorist attacks were an act of war against the United States.
In a meeting on September 12 with his National Security Team, Presi-
dent Bush said, "The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out
yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts
of war. This will require our country to unite in steadfast determination
and resolve. Freedom and democracy are under attack.
"The American people need to know that we're facing a different en-
emy than we have ever faced. This enemy hides in shadows, and has no
regard for human life. This is an enemy who preys on innocent and unsus-
pecting people, then runs for cover. But it won't be able to run for cover
forever. This is an enemy that tries to hide. But it won't be able to hide
forever. This is an enemy that thinks its harbors are safe. But they won't be
safe forever.
"This enemy attacked not just our people, but all freedom-loving peo-
ple everywhere in the world. The United States of America will use all of
our [sic] resources to conquer this enemy. We will rally the world. We will
be patient, we will be focused, and we will be steadfast in our determina-
tion. This battle will take time and resolve. But make no mistake about it:
we will win."
Frequently Asked Questions About the War on Terrorism at Home and Abroad, at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/response/faq-what.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2002).
5 See Thom Shanker, Rumsfelds Search for a Way to Fight a New Type of Foe, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 2002, at Al.
The deadliest strength of America's new adversaries is their very fluid-
ity, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld believes. Terrorist networks, un-
burdened by fixed borders, headquarters or conventional forces, are free to
study the way this nation responds to threats and adapt themselves to pre-
pare for what Mr. Rumsfeld is certain will be another attack.
Al Qaeda, for example, has leaders and budgets and command-and-
control and has proved it can inflict terrible damage, yet it cannot be at-
tacked in a traditional battle.
Mr. Rumsfeld ... focuses on maneuvering a steel-and-circuitry military
so its forces can better fight a "virtual enemy."
Id.; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitutional
Moment, 43 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (2002) ("It is a new kind of war, a war against stateless,
networked individuals. The goal of this war is not economic advantage, territorial gain, or
the submission of another state. It is to bring individuals to justice and to punish and deter
the states that harbor them." (citation omitted)).
6 See Mike Boettcher, Al Qaeda Forming New Cells Worldwide, CNN.com, at http://
www.cnn.com/2002/US/07/31 /al.qaeda.super.cells/index.html (July 31, 2002) ("Al
Qaeda members who fled Afghanistan after the U.S.-led counter-terrorism offensive began
last fall are forming what anti-terror coalition intelligence analysts are calling 'super cells'
in locations stretching from North Africa to Southeast Asia."); Danny Hakim, 4 Are Charged
with Belonging to a Terrorist Cell, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2002, at Al ("The government indicted
four ... men in federal court here today, saying they were part of a terrorist cell operating
in the Detroit area and were planning attacks in the United States, Jordan and Turkey.");
Nic Robertson & Mike Boettcher, Tapes Give Evidence of Al Qaeda's Global Reach, CNN.com,
at http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/08/22/terror.tape.main/index.html (Aug. 23, 2002)
("A careful examination of an al Qaeda video archive ... shows ... evidence of the terror-
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By the winter of 1961, the Cold War was already in its sixteenth
year. Soon after President Kennedy's inauguration, tensions between
the United States and the Soviet Union escalated rapidly with the Cu-
ban Missile Crisis, 7 the Berlin Wall Crisis,8 and eventually, the steady
intensification of the Vietnam Conflict.9 Similarly, the U.S. combat
against international terrorism10 is far from a new undertaking, as the
United States has previously responded to terrorist attacks against its
interests." However, before the end of its first year, the Bush Admin-
istration faced a nightmare come true: the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001. In responding to this new crisis, the Bush
ist network's global reach and links to other groups... . 'It gives a comprehensive picture
of al Qaeda's strategic gift, of al Qaeda's global reach.... It... clearly demonstrates that
al Qaeda is waging a universaljihad campaign."' (quoting Rohan Gunaratna, an expert on
al Qaeda).
7 The tense moments of the Cuban Missile Crisis began on October 16, 1962 and
subsided on October 28, 1962. See Cuban Missile Crisis in 3 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA 774 (15th ed. 1998).
8 The confrontation known as the Berlin Wall Crisis spanned from June to August,
1961. See generally NORMAN GELB, THE BERLIN WALL: KENNEDY, KHRUSHCHEV, AND A SHOW-
DOWN IN THE HEART OF EUROPE (1986) (discussing in depth the Berlin Wall Crisis).
9 The Vietnam Conflict lasted from 1955 to 1975. See Vietnam War in 12 THE NEW
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 7, at 361-63.
10 It is very difficult to define "terrorism":
It is virtually impossible to arrive at a comprehensive and definitive defini-
tion of the term "terrorism," basically for two reasons: first, the term is em-
ployed to denote a wide variety of acts; and secondly, States differ in their
perception of what constitutes terrorism. "The term is imprecise; it is am-
biguous; and above all, it serves no operative legal purpose. . . . [T]he
intentional use of violence or the threat of violence by the precipitators
(sic) against an instrumental target in order to communicate to a primary
target a threat of future violence. The object is to use intense fear or anxi-
ety to coerce the primary target into certain behavior or to hold its attitude
in connection with a demanded power (political) outcome."
ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICrIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 393-94 (Clive Parry et al. eds., 1986)
(citations omitted). In the context of foreign intelligence surveillance, international ter-
rorism is defined as activities that:
(1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation
of the criminal laws of the United States or of any other State, or that would
be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United
States or any State;
(2) appear to be intended-
(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coer-
cion; or
(C) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnap-
ping; and
(3) occur totally outside the United States, or transcend national bounda-
ries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they
appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpe-
trators operate or seek asylum.
50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2000).
11 See, e.g., infra Part II (discussing the 1986 bombing of Libya during the Reagan
Administration and the 1998 cruise missile strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan during
the Clinton Administration).
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Administration is testing the resolve of an international legal system
that was designed to address dilemmas vastly different from those that
currently exist in the post-Cold War world.
Accordingly, U.S. policymakers must be mindful of the very real
and lasting precedential effects of their chosen course for the War on
Terrorism. Indeed, the U.S. response to the heinous attacks of Sep-
tember 11 may forever alter the international rules governing state
responses to terrorist attacks, especially with regard to the proportion-
ality of such responses. This may be due in large part to the fact that
there has never been any authoritative definition of what is and what
is not a proportional state response to a terrorist attack. 12
So now, in the wake of the deadliest terrorist strikes in U.S. his-
tory, 13 the Bush Administration is filling this void with its own rules
and ideas about what is proportional and appropriate. According to
the Bush Administration, the United States-like no other nation in
the modern era-has a clear and justified mandate to use whatever
means it deems necessary to combat and defeat all forms of interna-
tional terrorism. 14 Adding credence to President Bush's policies to
combat terrorism, the American public in large part believes that ter-
rorism is a serious issue that the United States must address. 15 Clearly,
12 SeeYoRAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 184 (3d ed. 2001) ("[Pro-
portionality] is frequently depicted as 'of the essence of self-defence', although it is not
always easy to establish what proportionality entails.... [As such,] the principle of propor-
tionality must be applied with some degree of flexibility." (citations omitted)); Judith Gail
Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L. L. 391, 405
(1993) ("Proportionality is a complex concept to apply to particular cases and there will
inevitably be differences of opinion." (citation omitted)).
13 One year after the attacks, the death toll was more than 3,000 killed or missing:
In the first chaotic weeks after the Sept. 11 attacks, the list of missing
and presumed dead soared to nearly 7,000....
As the tally now stands, 3,025 people were killed on Sept. 11, or in the
weeks that followed, as a result of the terrorist attacks. That list, excluding
the 19 hijackers, consists of 2,801 killed or still missing from the World
Trade Center, 184 killed at the Pentagon and 40 killed on Flight 93, which
crashed near Shanksville, Pa. That combined loss of life will still record
that day as the second bloodiest day in the United States history, with the
Civil War battle of Antietam maintaining the miserable honor of first place.
Eric Lipton, Death Toll Is Near 3,000, but Some Uncertainty over the Count Remains, N.Y. TIMEs,
Sept. 11, 2002, at G47.
14 This mandate is found in language like the following:
Our war on terror is well begun, but it is only begun. This campaign
may not be finished on our watch; yet it must be and it will be waged on our
watch. We can't stop short. If we stop now, leaving terror camps intact and
terrorist states unchecked, our sense of security would be false and tempo-
rary. History has called America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsi-
bility and our privilege to fight freedom's fight.
President's State of the Union Address, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 133, 135 (Jan. 29,
2002) (emphasis added).
15 A 2001 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations survey of public opinion regarding
foreign affairs found that "Americans cited international terrorism more often than any
other issue as a 'critical threat to U.S. vital interests.'" PAUL R. PILLAR, TERRORISM AND U.S.
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the Bush Administration plans to use this sentiment as the foundation
for its eventual expansion of the War on Terrorism to targets outside
of Afghanistan. 16
However, before the United States marches onto the global bat-
tlefield, U.S. policymakers should consider whether the actions they
undertake in response to September 11 are proportional to the events
that transpired that terrifying morning in New York, Pennsylvania,
and Washington, D.C. Furthermore, they should consider the prece-
dent their actions are setting for the world community, as well as the
substantial impact and redefining force that that precedent will have
upon international law and the doctrine of proportionality. Though
Bush Administration officials warn that the War on Terrorism will be
long and could include many U.S. actions all over the world,17 the first
step in a proportionality analysis must focus on Afghanistan. Quite
simply, the question is: Do the events of September 11 justify the ex-
tent of the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan? More specifi-
cally, was the United States acting within the bounds of self-defense
when it toppled the Taliban regime in an effort to reach and bring to
FOREIGN PoLICY 1 (2001). Furthermore, in that same poll, "79 percent of the public (and
74 percent of a smaller sample of opinion leaders) said that combating international ter-
rorism should be a 'very important' goal of the United States." Id.
16 The Bush Administration has made clear almost from the start that it plans to ex-
pand the War on Terrorism beyond Afghanistan. In his State of the Union Address, Presi-
dent Bush said,
[T]ens of thousands of trained terrorists are still at large. These enemies
view the entire world as a battlefield, and we must pursue them wherever
they are. So long as training camps operate, so long as nations harbor ter-
rorists, freedom is at risk. And America and our allies must not and will not
allow it.
President's State of the Union Address, supra note 14, at 134.
17 See President's Address to Joint Session of Congress, supra note 2, at 1349 ("Our
response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should
not expect one battle but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen."); Meet
the Press (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 16, 2001) (transcript on file with author). Vice
President Dick Cheney stated:
It's also important for [the American] people to understand that this is a
long-term proposition. It's not like, well, even Desert Storm where we had
a buildup for a few months, four days of combat, and it was over with. This
is going to be the kind of work that will probably take years because the
focus has to be not just on any one individual, the problem here is
terrorism.
Id.; see also infra notes 168, 189 and accompanying text (discussing the Bush Administra-
tion's plan to conduct a global war against international terrorism).
[Vol. 88:155
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justice Osama bin Laden and his al Qaedal8 terrorist network?19 Few
deny the horrors of September 11. However, under the current sys-
tem of international law, the acuteness of that horror alone is not dis-
positive of whether the complete overthrow of the Taliban was a
proportionate response. Moreover, if the United States claims that it
can retain the right to self-defense 20 throughout the many months
and years of its war against terrorism, 21 is that assertion consistent with
the doctrine of proportionality?22
In simple situations where extreme retaliatory responses are not
warranted, the concept of proportionality is intuitive. For example,
imagine two young boys on a playground. If one boy shoves the other
in the back, does the boy who was shoved have the right to respond by
using deadly force against the boy who shoved him? Of course not.
Killing a person, even if he or she is the initial aggressor in a fight, is
not a proportionate response to a simple shove. Therefore, a lethal
response would be unjustified. Unfortunately, however, in the realm
of international relations, proportionality assessments are never this
simple. If the boys in this scenario are analogized to states, and the
playground to the global arena, the legal assessment of proportionate
responses becomes far more complex and susceptible to political
maneuvering. 23
18 Al Qaeda, the name designation for the international terrorist network headed by
Osama bin Laden, is an Arabic word meaning "the base." Judith Miller & Don Van Natta,
Jr., In Years of Plots and Clues, Scope of Qaeda Eluded U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2002, at 1.
Al-Qeada had its origins in the long war against the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan. After Soviet troops invaded the country in 1979, Muslims
flocked to join the local mujahedin in fighting them. In Peshawar, Pakistan,
which acted as the effective headquarters of the resistance, a group whose
spiritual leader was a Palestinian academic called Abdallah Azzam estab-
lished a service organization to provide logistics and religious instruction to
the fighters. The operation came to be known as al-Qaeda al-Sulbah-the
"solid base." Much of its financing came from bin Laden, an acolyte of
Azzam's who was one of the many heirs to a huge Saudi fortune derived
from a family construction business.
Michael Elliott, Hate Club, TIME, Nov. 12, 2001, at 58, 61.
19 Prior U.S. uses of force have been criticized as excessive and disproportionate. See,
e.g., Gardam, supra note 12, at 405 ("It appears that more was done than was proportionate
to expelling Iraq from Kuwait. As Walzer argues, these attacks indicate an illegitimate and
unjust aim, the overthrow of the Iraqi regime, and thus lose their legitimacy as actions in
self-defense."(citing MICHAEL WALZER, JUsT AND UNJUST WARS, at xx (2d ed. 1992))).
20 See infra note 68.
21 See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
22 See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
23 For example, as in the cases of the U.S. cruise missile strikes in response to the
1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1986,
both of which are discussed in greater detail in Part II of this Note.
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The concept of proportionality is inherently wedded to the right
of self-defense. 24 Indeed, proportionality can be seen as a sub-doc-
trine of self-defense that limits the severity and duration of actions
taken by states in self-defense.2 5 After the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11, however, a shift in state practice appears to be developing that
allows for a loosening of the proportionality regulation on the right to
self-defense in the context of responses to international terrorism. 26
This Note assesses the need for and the desirability of this shift in state
practice, and analyzes the impact that this shift will have on the U.S.
use of force in response to international terrorism in the
post-September 11 world.
Part I briefly outlines the history and development of the propor-
tionality doctrine, including a discussion of the Caroline incident and
Article 51 of the United Nations (U.N.) Charter.27 Part II focuses on
prior U.S. uses of force in response to terrorist actions-more specifi-
cally the 1986 bombing of Libya and the 1998 cruise missile strikes
against Sudan and Afghanistan-and comments on reactions to these
incidents. Part III analyzes the proportionality of the U.S. military in-
tervention in Afghanistan as well as the larger War on Terrorism, pro-
poses an international terrorism exception to the proportionality
limitation on the right to self-defense, and discusses the importance of
addressing the root causes of terrorism. This Note concludes that the
September 11 attacks demonstrate that an exception to the propor-
tionality doctrine, narrowly tailored to combat the growing threat of
international terrorism, has now become necessary. The need for this
exception is evidenced by the current shift in state practice that is
relaxing the traditional norms which regulate the right to self-defense
24 See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
316 (7th ed. 1997) ("[F]orce used in self-defence must be necessary, immediate and propor-
tional to the seriousness of the armed attack." (emphasis added)).
The concept of proportionality has its roots in domestic self-defense law. See, e.g., N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 35.15 (McKinney 1998)("A person may... use physical force upon another
person when and to the extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend him-
self or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of
unlawful physical force by such other person.
25 See MALANCZUK, supra note 24, at 316.
26 See infra notes 260-62, 268, 299 and accompanying text.
27
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures neces-
sary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Mem-
bers in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the author-
ity and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or
restore international peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
[Vol. 88:155
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with regard to the use of force in response to international terrorism.
This is due in large part to the complicated structure of international
terrorist organizations and the non-traditional nature of the threat
they present. However, in order to avoid a wholesale uprooting of the
proportionality doctrine as a limitation on the right to self-defense in
all contexts, U.S. policymakers must clearly articulate that this excep-
tion relates specifically to combating international terrorism. Such ar-
ticulation, if coupled with serious diplomatic and political attempts to
reevaluate U.S. foreign policy and address the root causes of terrorism
in the Arab and Muslim world, will enable the United States to most
effectively and completely wage a successful campaign against interna-
tional terrorism.
I
THE ORIGINS OF THE PROPORTIONAInIY DOCTRINE
A. Early Developments and the Laws of Armed Conflict
The application of the concept of proportionality to international
uses of force dates back hundreds of years. 28 The Christian 'just
war" 29 theory30 embraced a conception of the doctrine of proportion-
ality that was little more than an evaluation of whether the overall
28 See infta notes 29-30.
29 For many centuries, Western European attitudes towards the legality of war were
dominated by the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church. One of the first theologians
to write on the subject was St. Augustine (AD 354-430):
"Just wars are usually defined as those which avenge injuries, when the na-
tion or city against which warlike action is to be directed has neglected
either to punish wrongs committed by its own citizens or to restore what has
been unjustly taken by it. Further, that kind of war is undoubtedly just
which God Himself ordains."
MALANCZUK, supra note 24, at 306 (quoting St. Augustine). As one commentator has
noted,
These ideas continued to be accepted for over 1,000 years. War was re-
garded as a means of obtaining reparation for a prior illegal act committed
by the other side (the reparation sought had to be proportional to the seri-
ousness of the illegality). In addition, wars against unbelievers and heretics
were sometimes (but not always) regarded as being commanded by God.
Id. (citations omitted).
30 For a detailed description of the just war theory, see REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND
ARMED CONFLICTS: THE SELECTED WORKS ON THE LAWS OF WAR BY THE LATE PROFESSOR
COLONEL G.I.A.D. DRAPER, OBE 1-20 (Michael A..Meyer & Hilaire McCoubrey eds., 1998)
[hereinafter REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND ARMED CONFLICTS]. "' [F] or the natural order which
seeks the peace of mankind ordains that the monarch should have the power of undertak-
ing wars if he thinks it advisable, and that soldiers should perform their military duties on
behalf of the peace and security of the community."' Id. at 14 (quoting St. Augustine); see
also ROLAND H. BAINTON, CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR AND PEACE: A HISTORICAL
SURVEY AND CRITICAL RE-EVALUATION (1960) (describing thejust war theory);JAMES TURNER
JOHNSON, IDEOLOGY, REASON, AND THE LIMITATION OF WAR: RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR CON-
CEPTS 1200-1740 (1975) (same); FREDERICK H. RUSSELL, THEJUST WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES
(1975) (same).
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good that a war would cause outweighed its overall evil.3 ' Once the
cause of a war was considered just, any methods or means used to
bring about the objectives of that war were also permissible.3 2 This
concept is vastly different from the way in which most nations of the
world today view the doctrine of proportionality in the context of in-
ternational uses of force. 33
The modern view began to form as the nation-states of the nine-
teenth century abandoned the just war theory and instead began to
see war as an essential element of national policy.34 As a result, it was
during this period that the modern nation-states 35 began to develop
in earnest the laws regulating international armed conflict, culminat-
ing in the adoption of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.36 These laws
designate which practices of warfare are acceptable, including, for ex-
ample, the protection of civilian lives and the prohibition of certain
banned weapons and tactics. 37 As the laws of armed conflict were for-
mulated and codified, so too emerged the modern formulation of the
proportionality doctrine.38 This formulation of the proportionality
doctrine dictated that "belligerents do not have an unlimited choice
of means to inflict damage on the enemy."39 Prior to the First World
War, the relevance of this principle of proportionality was almost en-
tirely confined to combatants, since wars during the nineteenth cen-
31 See Gardam, supra note 12, at 395.
32 See id.
33 Id. ("The emphasis of Christian just war theory... was on the requirement of ajust
cause rather than on proportionality. Moreover, there was no independent doctrine of the
jus in bello as exists in international law today."(citation omitted)).
With regard to the above quotation from Gardam, it is important to note here the two
separate categories of action that are governed by the laws of war: the jus ad bellum and the
jus in befto. Jus ad belium refers to the rules governing the decision to resort to armed
conflict, while jus in bello relates to the rules that govern the actual conduct and behavior of
combatants once an armed conflict has begun (this category, also known as international
humanitarian law, can be thought of as the balance that is to be struck between the
achievement of a military goal and the cost in terms of casualties). See ENCYCLOPAEDIC
DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 200-01 (defining, in part, jus ad bel-
lum as "[t] he right to resort to war," and jus in bello as "the corpus of the laws and customs
of war").
34 Gardam, supra note 12, at 396.
35 The "nation-state" is defined as "[a] state structure in which a nation resides and
exists (ideally) to protect and promote the interests of that nation." STEVEN L. SPIEGEL,
WORLD POLITICS IN A NEW ERA, at B-14 (1995). "[During the period from 1648 to 1890,
t]he change in the nature of world politics from relations between rulers to relations be-
tween nations was a historical development of tremendous importance." Id. at 31.
36 See Gardam, supra note 12, at 396-97. For the historical background and general
principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, see REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND ARMED CON-
FLICTS, supra note 30, at 54-62.
37 See Gardam, supra note 12, at 397 ("[M]uch of the law of the means and methods of
warfare was codified between the middle of the nineteenth century and the Hague Confer-
ences of 1899 and 1907.").
38 Id.
39 Id. at 402.
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tury were primarily waged by professional soldiers on the battlefield,
and civilians were for the most part unihvolved. 40 However, this
quickly changed as aerial bombing began to develop as a method of
warfare during the First World War (1914-1918) and the Spanish Civil
War (1936-1939). 41 Because the destruction caused by aerial bomb-
ing could be incredibly indiscriminate between military and civilian
targets, its emergence demanded an increased scrutiny of the relation-
ship between civilian casualties and military necessity in armed con-
flicts. 42 Due to the extreme vulnerability of civilians to this form of
warfare, the primary focus of the modern proportionality doctrine
rests on the protection of civilian lives. 43
In addition to the laws of armed conflict, the proportionality doc-
trine plays a central role in regulating the use of force in self-defense.
This particular aspect has a somewhat separate and distinct history.
Any discussion of the general rules regarding the use of force in self-
defense must begin with the Caroline incident.44
B. The Caroline Incident and Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter
During the Canadian Rebellion of 1837, many U.S. nationals liv-
ing along the U.S.-Canadian border sympathized with and actively
supported the Canadian rebels in their struggle against British rule.45
Despite the U.S. government's attempts to prevent its citizens from
supporting the Canadian rebellion, on December 29, 1837, the U.S.
steamboat Caroline made trips between New York and Canada carrying
men and weapons in support of the rebellion.46 The British observed
the Caroline's activity and decided to destroy the steamer to prevent it
from further reinforcing the rebels.47 The British attacked the ship
while she was docked in Fort Schlosser, New York. 48 The Caroline was
burned and sent over Niagara Falls, killing two U.S. nationals. 49
Claiming no wrongdoing, the British defended their use of force
against the Caroline as an act of self-defense and self-preservation.50
40 See id. at 397.
41 See id. at 399.
42 See id.
43 Id. at 400.
44 For a more detailed account of the Caroline incident, see 2 JOHN BASSETr MOORE, A
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw § 217, at 409-14 (1906), and R.Y.Jennings, The Caroline and
McLeod Cases, 32 AM.J. INT'L L. 82, 82-92 (1938).
45 See Timothy Kearley, Raising the Caroline, 17 Wis. INT'L L.J. 325, 328 (1999).
46 See id.
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 See id.
50 See id. at 328-29.
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The United States immediately protested the affair.5' But it was
not until 1841 that the Caroline incident became one of the hallmarks
of customary international law regarding the right to self-defense and
the doctrine of proportionality. 5 2 This came about by way of a letter,
dated April 24, 1841, written by U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster
to Henry Fox, the British Minister in Washington, D.C.53 The letter
contained language that is now commonly referred to as the "Caroline
doctrine." In response to the British claim of self-defense, Webster
wrote that in order to be justified, the use of force in self-defense must
be necessary54 and proportionate,55 taking into consideration the circum-
stances of the particular case.56
The Caroline doctrine was soon accepted as the standard rule of
customary international law regulating all uses of force by a state act-
ing in self-defense. 57 As such, the Caroline doctrine has had a major
impact on how a state's resort to the use of force in self-defense is
5t See Martin A. Rogoff & Edward Collins, Jr., The Caroline Incident and the Development
of International Law, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 493, 496 (1990) (stating that U.S. Secretary of
StateJohn Forsyth sent a note of protest to the British Minister in Washington, D.C., Henry
Fox).
52 See Kearley, supra note 45, at 328-29.
53 The most relevant language from that letter is found in an excerpt that appeared
in a later letter sent by U.S. Secretary of State Webster to Lord Ashburton. See THE DIPLO-
MATIC AND OFFICIAL PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER WHILE SECRETARY OF STATE 104-11 (New
York, Harper & Bros. 1848).
54 Id. at 110 ("It will be for [the British] government to show a necessity of self-de-
fense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for delibera-
tion."). The necessity prong of the self-defense doctrine will not be analyzed in this Note.
Furthermore, for purposes of the proportionality analysis provided here, this Note assumes
that the U.S. use of force in self-defense to combat international terrorism satisfies the
necessity requirement. However, it must be noted that the question of necessity in the
context of the U.S. War on Terrorism is fertile ground for further study.
55 Id. ("It will be for [the British government] to show, also, that... [it] did nothing
unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be
limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.").
56
But the extent of this right [to self-defense] is a question to be judged
of by the circumstances of each particular case; and when its alleged exer-
cise has led to the commission of hostile acts within the territory of a power
at peace, nothing less than a clear and absolute necessity can afford ground
of justification.
Id. at 105.
57 There is wide support for this view. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 219 ("The
language used in Webster's correspondence, in the Caroline incident, made history. It
came to be looked upon as transcending the specific legal contours of extra-territorial law
enforcement, and has markedly influenced the general materia of self-defence."); 1 OPPEN-
HEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 420 (Sir RobertJennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992)
("[T]he basic elements of the right of self-defence were aptly set out in connection with
the Caroline incident in 1837 .... ); ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 10, at 361 ("Under customary international law, it is generally understood that
the correspondence between the USA and UK of 24 April 1841, arising out of the Caroline
Incident ... expresses the rules on self-defense .... ); Rogoff & Collins, supra note 51, at
498 ("This formulation, known as the Caroline doctrine, asserts that [the] use of force by
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viewed under international law. 58 But in the world today-beyond the
often intangible norms of customary international law-the modem
rules of international law, including those relating to the use of force
by states, are collected and enshrined in the Charter of the United
Nations. Article 2, paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter 59 imposes a ban
on virtually all international uses of force (otherwise known as the
non-intervention principle). 60 Article 51 is one of two exceptions to
the ban, allowing uses of force if taken pursuant to the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defense. 61 These are the rules for the
international use of force that, in theory, hold the greatest authority
in the modern global arena.
It is widely accepted that Webster's Caroline doctrine, and the
principles of necessity and proportionality contained therein, remain
the norm of customary international law62 and, in fact, heavily influ-
enced the formulation of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. As one
scholar has stated:
[M]any commentators believe that the "inherent right of self-de-
fense" referred to in Article 51 of the Charter consists of the right of
self-defense as it existed in customary international law at the time
the Charter was drafted. Under this theory, the Caroline doctrine
one nation against another is permissible as a self-defense action only if force is both neces-
sary and proportionate.").
However, not all commentators believe that the Caroline doctrine should be so broadly
interpreted as to regulate all uses of force in self-defense. See Kearley, supra note 45, at
329-30 (arguing that in applying the Caroline doctrine in its proper context, Webster only
intended the highly restrictive conditions of necessity and proportionality to apply to "uses
of force by one state within the territory of another state which had violated no interna-
tional legal obligations to the first state that might have justified that first state's use of
force[,]" and that Webster clearly "had no intention of creating any general rules for the
use of force by a state in self-defense").
58 For an interesting discussion of the use of the Caroline doctrine within the context
of the Judgment at Nuremberg in 1946-rejecting a self-defense claim by Germany in de-
fense of its invasion of Norway in 1940 and condemning the invasion as a "crime against
peace"-see Rogoff & Collins, supra note 51, at 504-05.
59 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.").
60 See G.A. Res. 103, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 79, U.N. Doc. A/36/51
(1981) ("Recognizing that full observance of the principles of non-intervention and non-
interference in the internal and external affairs of sovereign States and peoples, whether
direct or indirect, overt or covert, is essential to the fulfilment of the purposes and princi-
ples of the Charter of the United Nations .. "); Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 5, at
1 ("In 1945, the nations of the world, concerned about the continuing threat of interstate
aggression, committed to a basic principle of not using force in interstate relations. The
principle was articulated in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter ....").
61 See U.N. CHARTER art. 51. The other exception to Article 2, paragraph 4 is Article
53, which permits the use of force if directly authorized by the United Nations Security
Council. See U.N. CHARTER art. 53.
62 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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also is part of Charter law and should be applied as such. Moreover,
even if the drafters of Article 51 did not intentionally incorporate
the Caroline doctrine, the doctrine remains influential in the inter-
pretation of Article 51, as customary international law generally in-
fluences any interpretation of the Charter. Therefore . . . the
Caroline doctrine is of considerable significance. 63
Accordingly, the doctrine of proportionality-the notion that a
state may not respond to a use of force in any manner "unreasonable
or excessive" 4-is firmly established as an integral aspect of both cus-
tomary international law and, by extension, Charter law.65 Indeed,
there is no doubt concerning the status of the proportionality doc-
trine in Charter law, given its authoritative status in many U.N.-spon-
sored documents. 66
63 Kearley, supra note 45, at 327 (citations omitted). However, it should be noted
again that Kearley argues that current customary international law and Article 51 Charter
law incorrectly take the Caroline doctrine out of context by applying it to all uses of force.
See supra note 57. Nonetheless, there is still a majority of support for the proposition ex-
pressed in the material quoted here. See, e.g., Rogoff & Collins, supra note 51, at 506 ("Arti-
cle 51 words 'inherent right' refer to customary international law extant in 1945, when the
Charter was drafted. Customary law relating to self-defense is best expressed in Webster's
1841 note to Fox [which constitutes the Caroline doctrine language]." (citation omitted)).
Moreover, Rogoff and Collins note that "[s]tudents of international law relating to use of
force by one nation against another regularly encounter references to the Caroline inci-
dent, both in scholarly writings and in statements by government officials." Id.
64 See supra note 55.
65 See Gardam, supra note 12, at 391 n.3, 403 ("Proportionality as an element of self-
defense is uncontroversial."); John W. Head, Essay: The United States and International Law
After September 11, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 4-5 (2001); Louis Henkin, The Use of Force:
Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37, 45
(1989); Paul S. Reichler & David Wippman, United States Armed Intervention in Nicaragua: A
Rejoinder, 11 YALEJ. INT'L L. 462, 471 (1986); Eugene V. Rostow, Agora: The Gulf Crisis in
International and Foreign Relations Law, Continued: Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective
Self-Defense?, 85 AM.J. INT'L L. 506, 514 (1991); Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, 94, 103 (June 27).
In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice stated:
[Article 51 of] the [U.N.] Charter, having itself recognized the existence of
[the natural or inherent right of self-defense], does not go on to regulate
directly all aspects of its content. For example, it does not contain any spe-
cific rule whereby self-defence would warrant only measures which are pro-
portional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well
established in customary international law .... [Therefore,] customary in-
ternational law continues to exist alongside [Charter] law.
1986 I.C.J. at 94. "With regard to the characteristics governing the right of self-defence...
[t]he Parties also agree ... that whether the response to [an] attack is lawful depends on
observance of the criteria of the necessity and the proportionality of the measures taken in
self-defence." Id. at 103.
66 See, e.g., Kevin C. Kenny, Self-Defence, in 2 UNITED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES AND PRAC-
TICE 1162, 1167, at 18 (Rfidiger Wolfrum & Christiane Philipp eds., new rev. English ed.
1995) (stating with respect to self-defense that "[i]n addition to the specific requirements
of Article 51 [of the U.N. Charter], several other elements are universally accepted as re-
quired by customary international law: immediacy, proportionality and necessity [as first
mentioned by Webster in the Caroline incident]" (emphasis added)); Ronald St. John Mac-
donald, The Use of Force by States in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS
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. Having analyzed the relevant law and doctrines, a brief &scrip-
tion of how a state, under Charter law, can validly use force in re-
sponse to an attack by claiming Article 51 self-defense is helpful. This
is presently of particular relevance, given that the United States is jus-
tifying its actions in the War on Terrorism as a function of its "inher-
ent right"67 to self-defense. 68 In a perfect world free of conflict,
Article 2, paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter dictates that no state is ever
to threaten or use force against the "territorial integrity or political
independence of any [other] state."69 A use of force in contravention
of Article 2, paragraph 4 will most assuredly be a breach of the "non-
intervention principle"70 under customary international law. 71 Unfor-
tunately, however, we live in a world that is far from perfect, in which
states threaten or use force against other states all too frequently.7 2
AND PROSPECTS 717, 721 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991) (indicating that the Article 51
right to self-defense includes the Caroline doctrine, which pertains to a state's permissible
response to an attack).
67 See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
68 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 10740, 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001) ("Whereas [the acts of September 11] render it both necessary and appropriate that
the United States exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect United States citizens
both at home and abroad .... ); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001) ("Reaffirming... [the Security Council's] unequivocal condem-
nation of the terrorist attacks ... on 11 September 2001 .... [r]eaffirming the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the United
Nations."); Steven Erlanger, Russian Aide Warns U.S. Not to Extend War to Iraq, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 2002, at A10 ("[D]eputy secretary of defense, Paul D. Wolfowitz [said that] ... the
United States has the right to defend itself .... 'We were attacked, and.., we need to take
action to defend [ourselves]."'); Frederic L. Kirgis, The American Society of International Law
(ASIL) Insights: Israel's Intensified Military Campaign Against Terrorism, at http://www.asil.org/
insights/insigh78.htm (Dec. 2001) ("The United States has relied on its right of self-de-
fense in using military force to respond to the September 11 attacks."); cf Press Release,
NATO, Statement by the North Atlantic Council available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/
2001/pOl-124e.htm (Sept. 12, 2001) (stating that "[t]he Council agreed that... [the Sep-
tember 11 attacks] shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty" and that "[t]he commitment to collective self-defence embodied in the Washing-
ton Treaty was first entered into in circumstances very different from those that exist now,
but it remains no less valid and no less essential today, in a world subject to the scourge of
international terrorism").
69 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
70 See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 123, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1970).
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other
State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interfer-
ence or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its
political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international
law.
Id.
71 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, 109-10 (June
27).
72 The U.N. Charter does contain a system for the peaceful resolution of disputes
among states. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 33-38. However, once a state takes any action that is
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When a state determines that it has become the victim of an "armed
attack," 73 that state may respond with force against the aggressor
state.7 4 However, even after an armed attack occurs, the Article 51
right to self-defense is further limited7 5 by the requirements of neces-
sity,7 6 immediacy, 77 and proportionality.78 Therefore, to be allowed
under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, a use of force taken in self-de-
fense must: (1) be in response to an armed attack, (2) be of neces-
sity,79 (3) meet the immediacy requirement,80 and (4) meet the
proportionality requirement. It should be further noted that there is
considerable dispute as to how long and under what circumstances
the Article 51 right to self-defense continues to exist once invoked. 1
One of the major goals of the U.N. Charter system is the regula-
tion of the use of force by states in order to maintain international
interpreted as a threat to international peace or an act of aggression, a more serious and
forceful response is provided for under the Charter. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51.
73 See U.N. CHARTER art. 51. This Note assumes that the events of September 11,
2001, constituted an armed attack on the United States, though this issue is deserving of
further analysis in another study. There is no consensus as to whether terrorist attacks can
or should be categorized as armed attacks for Article 51 self-defense purposes. See, e.g.,
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 103 (requiring "action by regular armed forces... [or] 'the send-
ing by ... a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts
of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to' . . . an actual armed
attack conducted by regular forces"); Head, supra note 65, at 3 ("[T~he language [of
whether an armed attack occurs] is not on its face limited to [an attack on a state by
another state]; and it does not seem unreasonable to apply the language broadly to encom-
pass the terrorist acts of September 11 ...."); see also Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the
Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 Hous.
J. INT'L L. 25, 38-40 (1987) (discussing the scope of the requirement of an armed attack in
the context of an Article 51 claim of self-defense in response to a terrorist action).
74 See U.N. CHARTER art. 51; Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 110-11, 122-23; DINSTEIN, supra
note 12, at 165 ("Article 51 permits self-defence solely when an 'armed attack' occurs.");
Henkin, supra note 65, at 48; Reichler & Wippman, supra note 65, at 470 ("Self-defense
under [Article 511 may be exercised only in response to 'an armed attack."').
75 See DINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 183-85.
76 Id. at 184 ("[Tihere exists a necessity to rely on force (in response to the armed
attack) because no alternative means of redress is available.").
77 Id. at 183 ("[T]he two conditions of necessity and proportionality are accompanied
by a third condition of immediacy.").
78 Id. at 184 ("It is perhaps best to consider the demand for proportionality in the
province of self-defence as a standard of reasonableness in the response to force by
counter-force.").
79 The necessity of the U.S. actions in Afghanistan, and the U.S. response to Septem-
ber 11 in general, can be challenged. Again, this issue deserves further study but is beyond
the scope of this Note.
80 As with necessity, whether the U.S. use of force in Afghanistan complies with the
immediacy requirement may also be challenged.
81 See Abram Chayes, The Use of Force in the Persian Gulf, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 5-6 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991); Thomas
M. Franck & Faiza Patel, U.N. Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old Order Changeth", 85 Am. J.
INT'L L. 63, 63-64, 70, 73-74 (1991); Rostow, supra note 65, at 508-12.
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peace and security.82 The United States, of course, stands as the hege-
mon of the international realm. But has the United States been play-
ing by the rules laid down by the U.N. Charter in its uses of force in
response to terrorist activities? 83 More importantly, can the U.S. War
on Terrorism be waged within the permissible bounds of international
law and, specifically, the doctrine of proportionality?
II
ANALYZING PROPORTIONALITY IN PAST U.S. RESPONSES
TO TERRORISM
The United States used force in response to terrorist activities
with the 1986 bombing of Libya84 and the 1998 cruise missile attacks
against Sudan and Afghanistan. 85 As further described below, the
American public generally approved of these uses of force, despite the
many in the United States and abroad who criticized these strikes as
excessive and misguided. For the purposes of this analysis, however,
these events are most noteworthy for their similarities with the current
U.S. campaign against international terrorism.
A. The 1986 Bombing of Libya
On December 27, 1985, twenty civilians, including five Ameri-
cans, were killed and eighty injured when bombs ripped through air-
line offices in Rome and Vienna.8 6 Although no evidence directly
linked Libya with the attacks, the terrorists had passports that traced
back to Libya, and Libya's leader, Colonel Muammar el Qadhafi, was
credited with describing the attacks as "heroic."87 On March 24, 1986,
U.S. Navy fighter aircraft and Libyan military forces exchanged fire
while the U.S. fighters were engaging in a naval exercise over what
Libya considered its territorial waters.88 Thus, tensions were high be-
82 Under the U.N. Charter, the U.N. Security Council is the primary international
entity entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security. See FREDERIC L.
KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING 501 (2d ed. 1993).
83 For an interesting discussion of this question, see Paul H. Kreisberg, Comment,
Does the U.S. Government Think that International Law Is Important?, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 479
(1986).
84 See discussion infra Part II.A.
85 See discussion infra Part II.B.
86 W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L. 3,
30 (1999).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 31; see also William V. O'Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defense in Counterter-
ror Operations, 30 VA.J. INT'L L. 421, 463 (1990) (describing in more detail the U.S.-Libyan
confrontations in the Gulf of Sidra preceding the U.S. bombing of Libya).
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tween the United States and Libya89 in the spring of 1986,90 and
Qadhafi reacted by threatening terrorist attacks against U.S. nationals
and interests. 9' It was in this context that terrorists struck again, this
time in West Berlin. On April 5, 1986, terrorists bombed the La Belle
discotheque, a dance club frequented by U.S. service personnel. 92
Among the dead were two U.S. soldiers, and 229 people (including
seventy-eight U.S. nationals) were injured.9 3 Qadhafi exulted in the
attack and declared, "We shall escalate the violence against American
targets, civilian and non-civilian, throughout the world."94 On April
14, 1986, the United States, claiming to have intelligence linking
Libya to the La Belle discotheque terrorist attack and many other ter-
rorist attacks around the world,9 5 launched air strikes against targets
in Libya9 6 that were directly related to terrorist training, support, and
operations, as well as against a Libyan Air Force airfield.9 7 The Penta-
gon hailed the strikes as a rousing success.98 Though his personal
residence was bombed, Qadhafi escaped unharmed.99
89 See George J. Church, Targeting Gaddafi: Reagan Readies Revenge on a "Mad Dog",
TIME, Apr. 21, 1986, at 18 ("The world watched something it had never seen before: the
U.S. Navy moving into position so that the Commander in Chief could have the option of
militarily punishing another nation for its sponsorship of international terrorism.").
90 See Reisman, supra note 86, at 31. For a detailed discussion of the critical events
leading up the U.S. air strikes against Libya, see Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing
of Libya: An International Legal Analysis, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 177, 182-86 (1987).
91 See O'Brien, supra note 88, at 463.
92 See id.
93 Id.
94 Id. (citation omitted).
95 See Alan D. Surchin, Note, Terror and the Law: The Unilateral Use of Force and the June
1993 Bombing of Baghdad, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 457, 483-85 (1995) ("The United
States bombed Libya because of its continuous sponsorship of terrorist attacks."). In later
years, some doubt arose as to whether Libya was indeed behind the terrorist attacks that
prompted the U.S. bombing of Libya. See, e.g., Francis A. Boyle, Military Responses to Terror-
ism, 81 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 287, 290 (1987) ("It is now very clear from even a cursory
examination of the world press that Qadhafi was not responsible for the attacks in Rome
and Vienna. Indeed, the Ministers of the Interior from both Italy and Austria have stated
as much publicly.").
96 RobertJ. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread On Us". International Law and
Forcible State Responses to Terrorism, 12 Wis. INT'L L.J. 153, 185 (1994) ("On April 14, 1986,
American armed forces launched Operation 'El Dorado Canyon.' The half-hour bombing
raid struck five terrorist-linked targets in Tripoli and Benghazi .... ");Jeffrey Allen McCre-
die, The April 14, 1986 Bombing of Libya: Act of Self-Defense or Reprisal?, 19 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 215, 215 (1987) ("On April 14, 1986, United States Air Force F-1 ll's and Navy...
A-6 and A-7 fighter planes launched a strategic bombardment of five targets in Libya ....
An estimated thirty-seven Libyans, including civilians, were killed; ninety-three sustained
injuries." (citations omitted)); Sage R. Knauft, Note, Proposed Guidelines for Measuring the
Propriety of Armed State Responses to Terrorist Attacks, 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 763,
785 (1996) ("American F-ill [fighter/bombers] took off from bases in Great Britain ....
As a result of the attack, thirty-seven people were killed and ninety-three were injured."
(citations omitted)).
97 O'Brien, supra note 88, at 463-64.
98 See Intoccia, supra note 90, at 179.
99 Id.
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The Reagan Administration claimed self-defense to justify the
bombing of Libya.10 0 Shortly after the attacks, President Reagan deliv-
ered to the American public the now familiar sound bite: "Today, we
have done what we had to do. If necessary, we shall do it again."101
Reagan stated further, "When our citizens are abused or attacked any-
where in the world, on the direct orders of a hostile regime, we will
respond .... Self-defense is not only our right, it is our duty. It is the
purpose behind the mission undertaken tonight."10 2 U.S. Ambassa-
dor Vernon A. Walters was charged with the task of reporting the
bombing to the United Nations.'0 3 While stating that the United
States had "compelling evidence of Libyan involvement" 10 4 in terrorist
attacks directed against U.S. interests, he told the assembly of nations,
"In light of this reprehensible act of violence-only the latest in an
ongoing pattern of attacks by Libya-and clear evidence that Libya is
planning a multitude of future attacks, the United States was com-
pelled to exercise its rights of self-defense." 10 5 Thus, the Reagan Ad-
ministration went to great lengths to make its case that the Libyan
bombing conformed to the international legal norms regulating self-
defense.10 6
Regardless of the legal justifications, the attack was overwhelm-
ingly supported by the American public1 0 7 and the U.S. Congress. 10 8
The reaction from around the world, however, was far from warm.
100 Reisman, supra note 86, at 34 (stating that both the U.N. General Assembly and
U.N. Security Council rejected the Reagan Administration's invocation of Article 51 self-
defense as justification for the Libya bombing).
101 Reagan: 'We Have Done What We Had to Do, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1986, at A23 (re-
printing President Reagan's address to the Nation on Apr. 14, 1986).
102 Id.
103 See Intoccia, supra note 90, at 191.
104 Security Council Considers U.S. Self-Defense Exercise, 86 DEP'T OF STATE BULL., June
1986, at 18, 19.
105 Id.
106 See Intoccia, supra note 90, at 191-92. Thus, the legal grounds used tojustify the air
strike cited in the various statements made by President Reagan, Vice President Bush, and
Ambassador Walters may be broadly outlined as follows:
(1) Libya incurred liability because of its commission of terrorist acts
against Americans. (2) The American bombing of Libya constitutes legiti-
mately imposed sanctions or retaliation for Libyan-supported terrorism.
Moreover, retalistion serves to deter future terrorist acts. (3) Alternatively,
an ongoing threat of Libyan-supported terrorism necessitated self-defensive
measures.
Id. (emphasis added).
107 Id. at 187 ("A poll taken by the New York Times and the Columbia Broadcasting
System found that seventy-seven percent of the American public supported the bombing of
Libya .... " (citation omitted)).
108 Id. "American Congressional reaction overwhelmingly supported the decision to
bomb Libya. Even Congressional members who ordinarily [were] quite critical of Reagan
administration policies supported the strike." Id. (noting that Democrats Thomas "Tip"
O'Neil and Edward Kennedy had supported the raid even before President Reagan ad-
dressed the nation from the Oval Office).
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Indeed, the bombing was met with immediate and substantial criti-
cism from the international community. 10 9 Arab nations denounced
the attack,110 the U.N. Security Council did not support it,"' t and even
U.S. allies responded rather harshly. 112 The Soviet Union canceled a
conference that was to be held the following May between U.S. Secre-
tary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze, and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev characterized
the strike on Libya as indicative of a "militaristic and aggressive" policy
that threatened to damage U.S.-Soviet relations."13 Despite the initial
round of criticism from the world community, however, international
opposition, especially from the Western nations, lessened considera-
bly in the weeks following the bombing."a 4 This was due to a consen-
sus that was forming among the Western allies concerning the "extent
to which terrorism posed a threat to the international community and
the manner in which to deal with state-sponsored terrorism." 11 5
However, that sentiment did not abate criticism of the attacks
from international legal scholars. 1 6 Those critical of the Reagan Ad-
109 See id. at 177; Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the United States' Air
Operation Against Libya, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 933, 933 (1987).
110 Intoccia, supra note 90, at 177.
111 Id. at 189. A newspaper report of the United Nation's reaction stated the following:
In the United Nations, reaction to the air strike was decidedly against the
United States. The United States, Great Britain and France vetoed a Secur-
ity Council resolution that would have "condemn [ed] the armed attack by
the United States of America in violation of the Charter of the United Na-
tions." The resolution was sponsored by the Congo, Ghana, Madagascar,
Trinidad and Tobago, and the United Arab Emirates. Also voting in favor
of the resolution were Bulgaria, China, the Soviet Union, and Thailand.
Id. (citation omitted).
112 See id. at 187-88.
West Germany[, the nation that suffered the terrorist attack which was the
impetus for the U.S. bombing of Libya,] asserted that "a violent solution
will not be successful and is not very promising." Tens of thousands of
demonstrators marched and burned American flags in West Germany, Italy,
Sweden, and Great Britain.
Id. (citing Manning, In Western Europe, Strains Among Friends, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr.
28, 1986, at 24-25).
113 Id. at 189.
114 See id. at 177, 188-89.
115 Id. at 177-78 (citation omitted).
116 Though the purpose of this subpart is to discuss the critical responses to the 1986
bombing of Libya, it should be noted that there were a number of scholars who supported
the action as an effective response to terrorism. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 73, at 47 (argu-
ing that the Libyan bombing was neither disproportionate nor excessive); David P. Fidler,
War, Law & Liberal Thought: The Use of Force in the Reagan Years, 11 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
45 (1994) (defending the Reagan Administration's interpretation of international law re-
garding its use of force); Intoccia, supra note 90, at 212 ("In sum, the United States legiti-
mately acted in self-defense when it responded to ongoing Libyan-supported terrorism by
striking targets within Libya, which had some connection to Libya's capabilities to engage
in additional terrorist acts."); Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. SolfLecture
in International Law: Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REv. 89, 96,
104-05 (1989) ("The U.S. is committed to using force in its self defense only ... to the
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ministration concluded that the Administration's self-defense claim to
justify the 1986 bombing of Libya was not a permissible use of Article
51 of the U.N. Charter. 1 7 According to some scholars, the abrogation
of the U.N. Charter included a violation of the proportionality doc-
trine. 118 It was also observed that one of the key objectives of the Lib-
yan bombing was long-term deterrence, intending to "persuade Libya
and any other similarly inclined actors in the international community
that the support of terrorist activities against the United States is
bound to trigger an American response prohibitively costly to such
actors."119 However, after the Libyan raid, critics asserted that using
force for deterrence violated the international legal requirement of pro-
portionality.1 20 Furthermore, critics argued that for a use of force
taken in self-defense to be valid under international law, the degree of
force used cannot be excessive.121 Yet, the bombing of Libya
prompted the question: "'excessive' in relation to what?" 122 One
critic argued that the excessiveness and proportionality of the Libyan
bombing should have been measured "in relation to those threatened
attacks which were believed to be imminent at the time of the raid,
rather than in relation to Libyan terrorist activity, past and future,
taken as a whole." 123 However, this argument continued, the U.S. gov-
ernment's refusal to disclose to the public the details of the terrorist
attacks that it claimed Libya was planning made it rather difficult to
determine whether the air strike met the proportionality require-
ment.124 Despite this difficulty, the argument concluded that the U.S.
air raid on Libya was indeed disproportionate: "[T] he United States
would need to have had evidence that Libya was about to mount an
attack upon United States nationals and targets of such ferocity that a
highly destructive air strike which caused heavy casualties could rea-
sonably be regarded as a proportionate response."'125
Even if not addressing proportionality directly, the bombing of
Libya has been criticized as a clear violation of the generally accepted
extent it is proportionate to the threat defended against. [The U.S.'s] uses of force during
the Reagan Administration met these tests."); Knauft, supra note 96, at 785-86 ("Qadhafi
promised that future attacks on American citizens would occur. Therefore .... given the
level of state support for the terrorists and the larger pattern of terrorist aggression, the
United States response can be seen as justified.").
117 See, e.g., infra notes 126, 128-29 and accompanying text.
118 See, e.g., infra note 125 and accompanying text.
119 Alberto R. Coil, Military Responses to Terrorism: The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Mili-
tary Responses to Terrorism, 81 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 297, 299 (1987).
120 See id.
121 See Greenwood, supra note 109, at 946.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
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rules and norms of international law. 126 One scholar observed: "The
bombing of Libya by the United States was widely condemned and the
claimed justification widely rejected."' 1 7 In agreement wNith this view,
others have argued that the Reagan Administration abused the al-
ready uncertain doctrine of anticipatory self-defense1 28 and far ex-
ceeded the permissible bounds of force allowable in self-defensive
actions.' 29
An interesting critique of the Reagan Administration's attack on
Libya and its potentially damaging effects on the doctrines governing
the international use of force comes from the "Great Power Veto" the-
ory.130 As this concept has been described in the Libyan bombing
context (as well as in the context of other U.S. uses of force), the
United States wields its U.N. Security Council veto power as a means
to "frustrate the limits on self-defense as established by Article 51 and
U.N. practice.'' According to those who espouse this theory, a pat-
tern of U.S. behavior has emerged as follows: Once the United States
believes that an aggressor state poses a serious threat to its national
security, it first responds with unilateral military force, citing Article
51 self-defense as ajustification. Thereafter, the United States uses its
veto power to kill any draft resolutions in the U.N. Security Council
condemning its use of force.13 2 This more or less reflects the series of
events that took place in the Libyan bombing context.133 "Thus," the
126 See Fidler, supra note 116, at 45, 47-48 (stating that "[t] he Reagan Administration
has been severely criticized for the attitude it displayed towards international law on the
use of force[,]" and noting that "[plublicists ...charge that the Reagan Administration
violated the prohibition on the use of force in the United States' .. . bombing of Libya").
127 Henkin, supra note 65, at 46.
128 SeeJohn Quigley, The New World Order and the Rule of Law, 18 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L. &
COM. 75, 106 (1992). Professor Quigley argued,
[S]elf-defense in anticipation of an attack is a disputed doctrine, because
the U.N. Charter requires an 'armed attack' for invocation of self-defense.
Publicists who support the doctrine, and states invoking it, have said that
the force anticipated must be imminent. The Reagan ... [Administration],
however, routinely ignored the requirement of imminence in invoking self-
defense. In the bombing of Libya .. .they did not claim that the attacks
they purported to anticipate from [Libya] would occur imminently.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of
Twenty-First Century War and Its Possible Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict, 19 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 1051, 1073 (1998) ("[I]t is difficult to articulate the instant and overwhelming
need to resort to force [after the alleged Libyan terrorist bombings in Europe] had taken
place." (citations omitted)).
129 See Quigley, supra note 128, at 105.
130 See Oscar Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 263-64
(1989); Robert F. Teplitz, Note, Taking Assassination Attempts Seriously: Did the United States
Violate International Law in Forcefully Responding to the Iraqi Plot to Kill George Bush?, 28 CoR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 569, 591-92 (1995).
131 Teplitz, supra note 130, at 591.
132 See id.
133 See supra note 111. Note, however, that the United States was not able to thwart a
resolution condemning the bombing of Libya in the U.N. General Assembly. See Intoccia,
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argument concludes, "understanding the scope of the veto power is
important because of its potential to vitiate international restrictions
on the use of force in national self-defense."1 3 4
Beyond the aforementioned condemnations of the U.S. bombing
of Libya, perhaps the most far-reaching and complete rejection of the
legitimacy of the bombing is the following:
The Reagan Administration ordered the bombing of the Libyan
capital as retaliation for Libya's terrorist activities against the United
States and other Western countries. Customary international law
does not condone the use of force for purposes of retaliation or
deterrence. It permits the use of force only in self-defense and per-
haps, under some circumstances, in preemptive or anticipatory self-
defense. But the strikes against Libya were for purely retaliatory
purposes. No matter what justifications the Reagan Administration
gave for its action or how effective it has been in counteracting Lib-
yan-supported terrorism, the bombing was clearly a deviation from
the accepted international rules concerning the use of force by one
state against another.' 35
Many international observers agree that if the Libyan bombing
and similar uses of force are considered retaliatory actions or repri-
sals, then they are unacceptable uses of force under Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter.1 36
However, Reagan is not the only U.S. president to be charged
with playing fast-and-loose with the Article 51 self-defense justification.
Furthermore, the Reagan Administration is not the only U.S. adminis-
tration to receive criticism after launching military strikes in response
to terrorist actions. As described below, many of these very same di-
lemmas plagued the Clinton Administration as it, too, struggled to
respond effectively to international terrorist activity while at the same
time justifying those responses as within the confines of international
law.
supra note 90, at 189 ("The [U.N. General] Assembly adopted a resolution condemning
the American raid by a vote of 79 to 28, with 33 abstentions.").
134 Teplitz, supra note 130, at 591-92.
135 Stuart S. Malawar, Reagan's Law and Foreign Policy, 1981-1987: The "Reagan Corollary"
of International Law, 29 I-LARv. IN'r'L L.J. 85, 102 (1988) (citations omitted).
136
President Reagan on April 16, 1986 issued a statement indicating that
the United States took action against Libya under Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter; i.e., he stated that it was an act of anticipatory self-defense
in the face of clear and imminent danger. To some, if not most, in the interna-
tional community this action more closely resembled an act of reprisal, an action not
as universally accepted under international law.
Commander Byard Q. Clemmons & Major Gary D. Brown, Rethinking International Self-De-
fense: The United Nations'Emerging Role, 45 NAVAL L. Rv. 217, 225 (1998) (emphasis added).
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B. The 1998 Cruise Missile Attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan
At 10:30 a.m. on the morning of August 7, 1998, two large explo-
sives were detonated within minutes of each other inside the com-
pounds of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania. 137 In the carnage that resulted from those blasts, thousands
were injured and twelve Americans were among the dead. 38 The U.S.
government immediately suspected that Osama bin Laden was respon-
sible for the attacks. t 39 The United States responded quickly. Citing
what Clinton Administration officials described as "the strongest evi-
dence ever obtained in a major terrorist case[,]1 40 the United States
struck back by launching seventy-nine Tomahawk cruise missiles 141
from U.S. warships, directed at bin Laden's terrorist training camp in
Afghanistan and a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant 42 that the Admin-
istration suspected was producing chemical weapons components with
bin Laden's funding. 143
137 See Maureen F. Brennan, Comment, Avoiding Anarchy: Bin Laden Terrorism, the U.S.
Response, and the Role of Customary International Law, 59 LA. L. REV. 1195, 1195 (1999) ("The
twin blasts dismembered pedestrians and incinerated passengers on three buses, killing
258 people and injuring more than 5,400 others, including the U.S. Ambassador to Ke-
nya." (citation omitted)).
138 Id.
139 From the day of the explosions, U.S. officials suspected that Saudi Arabian
terrorist Osama bin Laden had orchestrated the attacks. The United States
said bin Laden participated in other attacks against U.S. interests, including
the 1996 bombing of an American military base in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.
Officials believed he managed his terrorist operations from a training camp
in Afghanistan, where he established his headquarters after his expulsion
from Sudan in 1996.
Id. (citations omitted)
140 James Risen, U.S. Says It Has Strong Evidence of Threat Justifying Retaliation, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at Al.
141 See Reisman, supra note 86, at 47.
142 Many critics later raised doubts about the quality of the evidence relied upon by
the Clinton Administration in its decision to strike the Sudanese pharmaceutical plant.
For a discussion of such doubts, see Sara N. Scheideman, Standards of Proof in Forcible Re-
sponses to Terrorism, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 249, 257-60 (2000).
143 Brennan, supra note 137, at 1195. It should be noted that Clinton's reasons for
striking Afghanistan and Sudan (in an effort to reach bin Laden) are analogous to Rea-
gan's reasons for attacking Libya (in an effort to reach Qadhafi). As Brennan explains:
[Though a]dmitting that the bin Laden terrorist "network" was not spon-
sored by any state, Clinton outlined four reasons for the action: 1) over-
whelming evidence showed bin Laden "played the key role in the embassy
bombings"; 2) his network had been responsible for past terrorist attacks
against Americans; 3) officials had "compelling information" that bin
Laden was planning future attacks and 4) his organization was attempting
to obtain chemical weapons. In a second statement, President Clinton care-
fully characterized the strikes as necessary to defend against the threat of
"imminent" and "immediate" future attacks, and not as retribution or
punishment.
Id. at 1195-96 (quoting President William J. Clinton, Remarks on Military Strikes Against
Afghanistan and Sudan, PuB. PAPERS 1460, 1460 (Aug. 20, 1998)).
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In his address to the nation, President Clinton told the American
people that the strikes against the "terrorist-related facilities in Af-
ghanistan and Sudan" were necessary because of the "imminent threat
they presented to [U.S.] national security." 14 4 Thus the Clinton Ad-
ministration, like the Reagan Administration before it, justified its re-
sponse to terrorist strikes by claiming self-defense. Indeed, when Bill
Richardson, the then-U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, wrote
the letter notifying the U.N. Security Council of the U.S. missile at-
tacks on Afghanistan and Sudan, he clearly laid out the U.S. argu-
ments in support of the attacks in the familiar language of self-
defense.1 45 Clinton's Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen, went
further by warning terrorist organizations that the United States
would not limit itself to "passive defense" when faced with choosing
either to "fight or fold in pathetic cowardice."1 46
Many of the same critiques of the Reagan Administration's bomb-
ing of Libya also apply to the Clinton Administration's cruise missile
attacks in Afghanistan and Sudan, leading many observers to conclude
that the cruise missile attacks violated the rules of international law.' 47
Indeed, one commentator suggested that the Clinton Administration
foresaw this criticism: "The care with which . . . President [Clinton]
and U.S. officials characterized the justification for the missile attacks
show[ed] their concern that the actions of the United States could be
144 President William J. Clinton, Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Ter-
rorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, PUB. PAPERS 1460, 1460 (Aug. 20, 1998).
145 Ambassador Richardson's letter to the President of the U.N. Security Council,
dated August 20, 1998, stated in part:
"These attacks were carried out only after repeated efforts to convince the
Government of Sudan and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to shut these
terrorist activities down and to cease their cooperation with the bin laden
organization. That organization has issued a series of blatant warnings that
"strikes will continue from everywhere" against American targets, and we
have convincing evidence that further such attacks were in preparation
from these same terrorist facilities. The United States, therefore, had no
choice but to use armed force to prevent these attacks from continuing. In
doing so, the United States has acted pursuant to the right of self-defence confirmed by
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. The targets struck, and the tim-
ing and method of attack used, were carefully designed to minimize risks of
collateral damage to civilians and to comply with international law, includ-
ing the rules of necessity and proportionality."
Reisman, supra note 86, at 48-49 (quoting Letter from Bill Richardson, the Permanent
Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, to the President of
the Security Council of the United Nations (Aug. 20, 1998), U.N. Doc. S/1998/780, availa-
ble at http://www.undp.org/missions/usa/s1998-780.pdf) (emphasis added).
146 See Scheideman, supra note 142, at 250.
147 See, e.g., Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of
Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALEJ. INT'L L. 537, 557 (1999) (" [T]he August 20 missile strikes
represent the assertion of imperial might and arrogance [by the United States] in opposi-
tion to international law."); see also infra notes 149, 152-53 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing various scholars' arguments that the cruise missile attacks violated international law).
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perceived as a violation of international law."1 48 But, of course, such
care did not insulate the Clinton Administration from scrutiny by in-
ternational legal scholars.
For example, one scholar charged that a "very strong argument"
could be made that the U.S. cruise missile strikes in Afghanistan and
Sudan violated the customary international law norm regarding pro-
portionality.149 In characterizing the cruise missile strikes as more like
a "retaliation rather than legitimate self-defense[,]' 150 critics took is-
sue with the fact that the targets of the attacks in both Afghanistan
and Sudan had no direct link to any "imminent" attack against the
United States.' 5 ' Another observer agreed that, far more likely than
not, the destruction of the terrorist training camps in Afghanistan,
and certainly the leveling of the pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, did
not meet the proportionality requirement regulating uses of force in
self-defense.' 52 This analysis further concluded that, no matter how
the Clinton Administration chose to justify the attacks-whether as
retaliation or as self-defense-the equation simply did not add up to
an acceptable use of force under international law. 153 Indeed, these
criticisms highlight the same sticky "damned if you do, damned if you
don't" conundrum also faced by the Reagan Administration in its de-
cision to bomb Libya in 1986: The overwhelming historical and politi-
148 See Brennan, supra note 137, at 1197.
149 See id. at 1209.
150 Id. at 1210.
151 As Brennan noted:
The United States also did not respond proportionally to the attacks or to
so-called "imminent" attacks. In the attack on Libya in 1986, Professor
Paust criticized the United States for striking Libyan bombers and training
facilities because those targets did not seem directly related to "imminent"
threats or attacks in process, but rather involved Libya's long-term capabili-
ties. The same criticism applies to the Sudan and Afghanistan strikes. In
addition, even if the evidence about the Sudanese pharmaceutical plant was
accurate, could chemical weapons components be used in an "imminent" at-
tack leaving no moment for deliberation? The same is true of the Afghan
training camps. Though the United States quickly noted that it believed a
meeting of terrorist leaders occurred at the time of the strikes, the United
States revealed no evidence that additional attacks were so imminent that it
was forced to strike Afghan territory to prevent them. The strikes may also
have not met the immediacy requirement. In 1986, the United States re-
ceived criticism for waiting ten days before striking Libya. In the recent
strikes the United States took action after fourteen days. This longer delay
renders the strikes even more suspect as actions in reprisal than did the
delay of ten days before the Libyan strikes.
Id. at 1209-10 (citations omitted).
152 See Leah M. Campbell, Defending Against Terrorism: A Legal Analysis of the Decision to
Strike Sudan and Afghanistan, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1067, 1095 (2000).
153 See id. at 1096 ("If the purpose of the strikes was retaliatory, it contravened conven-
tional international law. If the strikes were motivated by self-defense, it appears that the
necessary elements [an armed attack, necessity, immediacy, and proportionality] were not
present.").
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cal pressure to respond to terrorist attacks with force, inhibited by the
equally extreme difficulty of legally justifying such military acts. 154
As alluded to previously, "Self-defense is a nebulous concept with
fluid boundaries. ' 15 5 The rationales used to justify the 1986 bombing
of Libya and the 1998 cruise missile strikes in Sudan and Afghanistan,
and the subsequent debates they engendered, certainly illustrate that
point. Thus, as the United States heads into its War on Terrorism,
U.S. policymakers are yet again thrust into the murky waters surround-
ing the international legal norms of the self-defense and proportional-
ity doctrines. As the Reagan and Clinton Administration case studies
demonstrate, the United States is certainly susceptible to further criti-
cism for its forcible responses to the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Inevitably, U.S. policymakers will become entangled in a thorny de-
bate over the justifications for its efforts toward eradicating global ter-
rorism. Therefore, the time is ripe to ask:
III
Is THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE SEPTEMBER 11
ATTACKS PROPORTIONAL?
The U.S. military's targeting and toppling of the ruling Taliban
and the evisceration of the al Qaeda terrorist network in Afghani-
stan 156 raise many questions about whether the United States re-
sponded proportionately to the September 11 attacks. First, a brief
overview of the facts is needed to better consider these questions of
proportionality: A loosely-knit band of terrorists, hailing from several
countries,1 57 hijacked four U.S. passenger aircraft. Two of the airlin-
ers crashed into each of the twin World Trade Center towers in New
York City, causing both towers to collapse. 158 Another aircraft de-
154 See Federica Bisone, Comment, Killing a Fly with a Cannon: The American Response to
the Embassy Attacks, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 93, 113 (2000) (" [W]hile a historical
argument for state responses to terrorist attack supports American involvement in Afghani-
stan and Sudan, legally justifying the military action presents problems.").
155 Sanya Popovie, Deterrence, Defense, and the Requirements of an Effective Counterterrorism
Strategy, 3 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 315, 319 (1993); see also supra note 12 (describing the
requirement of proportionality as susceptible to differing opinions).
156 Though the military activities in Afghanistan against al Qaeda and the Taliban
were, and continue to be, mostly performed by U.S. personnel using U.S. military equip-
ment, other nations have contributed military assets to assist in the effort, including the
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
New Zealand, Poland, Russia, and Turkey. See THE COALITION INFORMATION CENTERS, THE
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: THE FIRST 100 DAYS 12 (2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/12/ 100dayreport.html [hereinafter GLOBAL WAR].
157 See Peter Finn, Hijackers Depicted as Elite Group, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2001, at Al ("Of
the [September 11] hijackers, [fifteen] were from bin Laden's homeland, Saudi Arabia,
two hijackers were from the United Arab Emirates, one was from Lebanon and one from
Egypt .... ").
158 See 'A National Tragedy': Terrorism Hits New York and Washington, WASH. POST, Sept.
12, 2001, at C16.
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stroyed one wing of the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. 159 The final
hijacked jet hurtled to the earth, crashing in a Pennsylvania field. 160
The attack resulted in the deaths of over 3,000 people, 161 the vast ma-
jority of whom were American civilians. 162 In response, the United
States launched a massive military strike in Afghanistan against the al
Qaeda terrorist network and the ruling Taliban regime that harbored
and supported them, resulting in weeks of sustained bombing and the
eventual crumbling and displacement of the Taliban government. 63
The United States justified the military strikes by arguing that the al
Qaeda terrorist network organized and carried out the September 11
attacks, and that the Afghanistan-ruling Taliban harbored and sup-
ported al Qaeda.164 Accordingly, the United States claimed, it had the
right to respond in self-defense.' 65 As described above, such a claim
entails meeting the requirements of: (1) an armed attack, (2) neces-
sity, (3) immediacy, and (4) proportionality. 66
Detached from the horrors of September 11, this situation may
be analogized to the aforementioned hypothetical scenario of the
children on the playground. If the strict standards of Webster's Caro-
line doctrine are applied, 167 then the U.S. response was unreasonable
and excessive, and therefore disproportionate: the terrorists crashed
airplanes into three buildings, and in response the United States used
a vast and crushing display of its military might to destroy and over-
throw an entire government almost a month after the precipitating
159 See id.
160 See id.
161 See supra note 13.
162 In addition to the Americans killed, individuals from 80 different nations died in
the terrorist attacks of September 11. GLOBAL WAR, supra note 156, at 5.
163 See id. at 11.
164 See George W. Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing Strikes Against Al Qaida
Training Camps, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1432, 1432 (Oct. 7, 2001). After initiating
the strikes in Afghanistan, President Bush stated the following:
[T]he United States military has begun strikes against al Qaeda terrorist
training camps and military installation of the Taliban regime in Afghani-
stan. These carefully targeted actions are designed to disrupt the use of
Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capa-
bility of the Taliban regime.
More than 2 weeks ago, I gave Taliban leaders a series of clear and
specific demands: Close terrorist training camps; hand over leaders of the
al Qaeda network .... None of these demands were met. And now the
Taliban will pay a price. By destroying camps and disrupting communica-
tions, we will make it more difficult for the terror network to train new
recruits and coordinate their... plans.
Id.
165 See supra note 68.
166 See DINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 183-85 (describing the conditions precedent to the
exercise of self-defense).
167 See supra notes 54-56.
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attack. 168 Such actions fly in the face of the conventional interpreta-
tion of the proportionality doctrine. However, no clear international
legal rule requires the application of this strict understanding of pro-
portionality.16 9 Indeed, there remains considerable debate over ex-
actly what proportionality means, and which standard should apply in
regulating responses to terrorism. 170 The following debate highlights
the three most prevalent definitions of proportionality in this context.
A. The Debate over How to Calculate the Proportionality of
Responses to Terrorist Attacks
Though international scholars generally agree that the use of
force in response to a terrorist attack must be proportionate to the
initial precipitating attack, no consensus among them exists as to how
to properly calculate proportionality. 7 1 Three different approaches
to measuring the proportionality of responses to terrorism have been
proposed: (1) the "tit-for-tat," or "eye-for-an-eye" approach, 172 (2) the
"cumulative proportionality" approach, 173 and (3) the "eye-for-a-
tooth" or "deterrent proportionality" approach. 174
In an article analyzing the Libyan bombing, the "tit-for-tat" ap-
proach was promoted as one that limited the right to self-defense by
requiring that the amount of force used be proportionate to the
threat and not exceed the force necessary to repel the threat.175 Fur-
168 The proportionality of the U.S. response to September 11, under the strict Caroline
guidelines, comes into further question if the United States fulfills its promise to hunt
down and destroy all forms of global terrorism wherever it exists around the globe and to
engage in such activities, including the use of force, for an indefinite period of time. The
United States claims that the mandate of September 11 requires no less. See Bush, supra
note 164, at 1432. In his address to the nation announcing the attacks in Afghanistan,
President Bush declared:
Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is broader. Every nation has
a choice to make. In this conflict, there is no neutral ground. If any gov-
ernment sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, they have become
outlaws and murderers, themselves. And they will take that lonely path at
their own peril.
Id.; see supra note 16 and accompanying text; infra note 249 and accompanying text.
169 See supra note 12; infra Part III.A.
170 See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
171 See Beck & Arend, supra note 96, at 206.
172 See id. (stating that this approach requires that the "victim state ... respond propor-
tionately to the specific prior act of terrorism" (quoting Oscar Schachter, The Extra-7ritorial
Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases, 11 Hous.J. INT'L L. 309, 315 (1989) (emphasis added))).
"The U.N. Security Council in several cases, most involving Israel, has judged proportional-
ity by comparing the response on a quantitative basis to the single attack which preceded it."
Id. (emphasis added).
173 Id. (describing this theory of proportionality as one in which "the victim state's
forcible measures should be proportionate to an aggregation of past illegal acts").
174 Id. (characterizing this approach as one in which "the victim state's use of force
must be proportionate to the overall terrorist threat faced by the state," and adding that
this third approach is "future-directed").
175 See Intoccia, supra note 90, at 205.
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thermore, "a claim of self-defense must be rejected if the nature and
amount of force used is disproportionate to the character of the initi-
ating coercion." 176 Thus, any response to an act of aggression that
uses more force than is strictly necessary to "counter any continuing
immediate threat" is not allowable under the "tit-for-tat" approach. 177
Applied to the U.S. actions in Afghanistan, the "tit-for-tat" approach
would require one to balance all of the U.S. uses of force in Afghani-
stan against the September 11 terrorist attacks, and any other immedi-
ate terrorist threats faced by the United States, and ask: Did the
United States do more than necessary to negate the threats it faced?
The answer to this question-given the severity of the September 11
strikes and the very real fear that similar attacks were on the way-is
not clear, and certainly reasonable people may disagree.
The "cumulative proportionality" approach posits that "[r]ough
equivalence in the number of deaths and extent of property damage
remains the sine qua non of proportionality." 178 Under this approach,
states can use the accumulation of smaller prior events, such as minor
terrorist acts, to justify single, larger-scale responses under certain cir-
cumstances.1 79 Thus, under the "cumulative proportionality" theory,
the United States could factor into the equation not only September
11, but also other terrorist strikes such as the 1993 attempt to topple
the World Trade Center towers, 180 the 1998 African embassy bomb-
ings, 18 1 and the deadly attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000.182 But exactly
how far back can the United States go? And did not the United States
already respond to some of those attacks, for instance, when it
launched cruise missiles against Afghanistan and Sudan?
Despite significant rejection by many international legal scholars,
some still advance the "deterrent proportionality" approach. 183 One
176 Id. at 206.
177 See id.
178 Guy B. Roberts, Self-Help in Combatting State-Sponsored Terrorism: Self Defense and Peace-
time Reprisals, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 243, 281 (1987).
179 See id. at 282.
180 See Malcolm Gladwell, At Least 5 Die, 500 Hurt as Explosion Rips Garage Under World
Trade Center, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1993, at Al; Malcolm Gladwell, Sheik, 9 Others Convicted in
N.Y. Bomb, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1995, at Al ("[T]he Feb. 26, 1993, World Trade Center
bombing .. . killed six people, injured more than 1,000 and did $500 million worth of
damage.").
181 See supra Part II.B.
182 See Susan Page, A Decade of Terrorism, USA TODAY, Nov. 12, 2001, at 9A (stating that
the blast caused by a terrorist attack against the U.S.S. Cole killed seventeen U.S. sailors).
183 Supporters of the "cumulative proportionality" approach have specifically rejected
the "deterrent proportionality" approach:
If an unfounded expectation of a massive enemy attack or a series of attacks
can justify a massive anticipatory thrust to deter the imagined onslaught,
then the rule of law would be irrelevant. Furthermore, proportionality
would have no meaning since preventive application of force ... provides
no ready reference point for the calculation of a proportional response.
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scholar has argued, "Counterterror measures should be proportionate
to the purposes of counterterror deterrence and defense, viewed in
the total context of hostilities as well as the broader political-military
strategic context."184 In a 1987 American Society of International Law
panel, another commentator agreed with this view: "Even though de-
terrence is incompatible with strict proportionality .... [a] n appropri-
ate standard would be that the violence threatened or actually used in
deterring an adversary should be the minimum necessary to persuade
him not to undertake aggression in the future."1 8 5 To further confuse
the issue, some scholars have even promoted a combination of the
"cumulative" and "deterrent proportionality" approaches by sug-
gesting that uses of force in self-defense should be weighed against all
immediately preceding attacks as well as the probability and size of
future attacks.1 86
Clearly, the theory that best suits the U.S. response to September
11, both in Afghanistan and on the grand scale, is the "deterrent pro-
portionality" approach, or perhaps the suggested combination of the
"cumulative" and "deterrent proportionality" approaches. But even if
U.S. policymakers chose one of these approaches, who would judge if
they were right? Would their decision be based on convenience or
actual legal contemplation? As this survey of the different measures
for calculating proportionality demonstrates, attempting to reach a
universal and binding definition for proportionality is essentially an
academic exercise, the result being that the issue will likely remain
unresolved as the debate rages on.
B. Can the War on Terrorism Fit Within the Rules of Self-
Defense?
Recall the statement: "[B]elligerents do not have an unlimited
choice of means to inflict damage on the enemy."1 87 The right to self-
defense under international law is not a blank check to destroy one's
enemy; indeed, self-defense is limited by the requirements of an
armed attack, necessity, immediacy, and proportionality. 18 8 This stan-
dard dictates that the right to self-defense exists only as a mechanism
for self-preservation, and only lasts as long as it takes the victim of the
Making justifications for reprisal on the basis of a future wrong is difficult
since the wrong supposedly justifying the retaliatory response has yet to
occur.
Roberts, supra note 178, at 282.
184 O'Brien, supra note 88, at 477.
185 Coll, supra note 119, at 299.
186 See Baker, supra note 73, at 47 ("[W]hen responding to a continuing series of at-
tacks .... self-defensive measures should be weighed against all attacks immediately prior
to the response, and, more importantly, the probability and size of future attacks.").
187 Gardam, supra note 12, at 402.
188 See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
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attack to address the immediate threat to that self-preservation. But
how do these academic standards translate into the real world, espe-
cially in the face of the ever-growing menace of international terror-
ism? Can the rules of self-defense, with the doctrine of
proportionality chiefly among them, adapt to this changing threat?
If the Bush Administration is correct-that the only way to ad-
dress and defeat international terrorism is to engage it wherever it is
found189-then that mission is far beyond the scope of any response
to an attack that any nation has ever attempted during peacetime.
The debates concerning proportionality discussed above suggest that
a significant number of international legal observers would most likely
conclude that such a response violates the doctrine of proportional-
ity.190 Many would probably reach that conclusion even if they ap-
plied an expanded view of the current international rules regulating
the right to self-defense.' 91 Does this automatically mean that the
United States has no other option but to risk shattering international
legal norms in order to respond to terrorism in the way it currently
thinks necessary? Possibly not, since there are also those who would
likely argue that the current U.S. actions in Afghanistan and the
larger War on Terrorism do not violate international law. 192 However,
such conclusions do not appear to actually conform to the standards
of international legal doctrine regarding the use of force in self-de-
189 See supra note 16; see also President's State of the Union Address, supra note 14, at
134 ("[O]ur war against terror is only beginning .... Thousands of dangerous killers,
schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread
throughout the world .... ").
190 See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text; see also infra note 214 and accompa-
nying text (providing the opinions of critics who believe that the Bush Administration's
stated goals for the U.S. War on Terrorism violate international law).
191 See supra notes 175-82 and accompanying text.
192 See, e.g., Jack M. Beard, America's New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under
International Law, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 559, 589 (2002) ("While some [have criti-
cized] America's previous uses of force against terrorist supporting states, the case for
America's forcible response to the September 11 attacks as being fully consistent with the
inherent right of self-defense under customary international law and Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter is very strong."); Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law After
11 September, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 401, 410 (2002) (noting that "[h]aving seized the
opportunity to establish self-defense as an accepted basis for military action against some
terrorist attacks, the U.S. will now be able to invoke it again-even when the circumstances
are less grave," and therefore "[i]t is ... plausible to regard the choice ofjustification as, in
part, a strategic decision directed at loosening the legal constraints on the use of force to
the ongoing advantage of the U.S."); cf Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in
Afghanistan and Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 2002) (arguing that the U.S.
use of force in Afghanistan against Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda members was permissi-
ble under international law, but the U.S. military action directed at the Taliban regime was
not permissible).
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fense, but rather seem to make the case for an exception to the
rules.t 93
After September 11, global terrorism is undeniably a very real
and serious threat to U.S. national security, and the United States is
learning that some responses to terrorism better serve its security in-
terests than others. For instance, launching cruise missiles against a
terrorist training camp that can be rebuilt or relocated within a
month is no longer an effective strategy for combating global terror-
ism, if indeed it ever was. As such, the United States is now presiding
over an extraction of the proportionality limitation from the self-de-
fense doctrine that it regulates. In the past, policymakers went to
great lengths to make elaborate justifications for U.S. uses of force in
recognition of the fact that the right to self-defense is a limited one. 194
Yet, this time around, the United States seems to believe it has a man-
date to go the distance, regardless of the international legal stan-
dards. 195 And, in what threatens the conventional standards of the
proportionality doctrine even more, it seems to many in the United
States (and arguably to many in nations allied with the United States
as well) that the United States did not overreact in Afghanistan at
all.' 96 For those concerned with adherence to international legal
193 The law has played-and must continue to play-an important role in
marking the limits and conditions on measures used to protect our national
security against state-sponsored terror. Many proposed military actions
were considered and rejected during recent years on legal grounds. That
must and will continue to occur. But the law must not be allowed improp-
erly to interfere with legitimate national security measures. In important
respects, it is doing so today.... [When] unwarranted limitations are...
imposed on counter-terrorist actions [] under . . . international law...
such limitations may pose [dangers].
Sofaer, supra note 116, at 90; see also Baker, supra note 73, at 47 (arguing that responses to
terrorist attacks may not fit within Article 51, but are nevertheless justified, and thus an
expansion of Article 51 is required); Malawer, supra note 135, at 102 (suggesting that the
Libyan bombings will lead to a new set of rules applicable to cases in which a state uses
force in response to terrorist attacks).
194 See, e.g., Risen, supra note 140 (providing President Clinton's justifications for the
cruise missile strikes against Afghanistan and Sudan).
195 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
196 See infra note 261 and accompanying text; see also Beard, supra note 192, at 559, 560
(noting that the international community's response "to the September 11 terrorist attacks
on the United States and important factual and legal distinctions between the circum-
stances surrounding the September 11 attacks and previous attacks ... demonstrate the
propriety of the exercise of self-defense in this case under the U.N. Charter and customary
international law."); Michael J. Kelly, Understanding September 11th-An International Legal
Perspective on the War in Afghanistan, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 283, 285 (2002) (" [T] he toppling
of the repressive Taliban, pursuit of international terrorists and creation of conditions for a
new coalition government in Afghanistan are certainly proportional to the massive loss of
life in America coupled with the astounding physical destruction we suffered."); EU Leaders
Back Bombing Strategy, CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/ 11/05/
ret.europe.summit/index.html (Nov. 5, 2001) ("German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
says European Union leaders are united in their support of the U.S. military campaign in
Afghanistan.").
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principles, like those contained in the U.N. Charter, does this devel-
opment mean that the proportionality limitation on the right to self-
defense is now to be completely abandoned? Should the United
States be free to do as it pleases after enduring the September 11
attacks?
It is unquestionable, indeed almost intuitive, that proportionality
must remain an important limitation on international uses of force.
In fact, precisely because the proportionality doctrine is currently be-
ing tested to its utmost limits is what makes it now more important
than ever before. The concepts underlying the proportionality doc-
trine must hold together, or nations will be uninhibited from mount-
ing excessive and overzealous campaigns against their enemies-so
long as they can concoct some feasible, yet meritless, claim of self-
defense after the fact. Areas of great volatility exist in every corner of
the globe, and once terrorism is added into this equation, the poten-
tial outcomes become all the more deadly.
Therefore, although the United States wants to combat global ter-
rorism effectively, U.S. policymakers should not let their War on Ter-
rorism serve as a precedent for the wholesale abandonment of the
proportionality doctrine. Other nations may use that precedent as a
justification for unleashing their military might against hostile targets,
distorting the concept of the right to self-defense. If that were to hap-
pen, the possibility exists that the right to self-defense may become, in
practice, much more like the blank check that it is not supposed to be.
C. Proposal for an International Terrorism Exception to the
Proportionality Doctrine
Now that the United States is faced with this critical problem,
what is it to do? How can the United States fight its War on Terrorism
and still preserve some semblance of the rule of international law?
Despite U.S. national security interests, U.S. policymakers should not
feel comfortable with a redefinition of the self-defense doctrine that
does not include the proportionality limitation.
Instead of attempting to squeeze the U.S. War on Terrorism into
ajustification in which it does not fit, U.S. policymakers would be bet-
ter served if they clearly articulated an expanded version of the pro-
portionality doctrine as it relates to international terrorism. In order
to more properly and logically address the current threats to U.S. na-
tional security, a revision of the proportionality doctrine-narrowly
tailored to effectively address and combat international terrorism-
would allow the United States to respond to the September 11 attacks
in a manner beyond that which would normally be acceptable under
the traditional notions of the right to self-defense. It is important to
stress that this proportionality exception would be specifically limited
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only to measures taken to combat international terrorism. The excep-
tion would not extend to the classic right of self-defense, that being a
response to a military strike by one state upon the territorial integrity
of another state, 197 nor would it cover conflicts normally considered
to be civil wars or regional territorial disputes. By moving beyond the
scope of traditional proportionality, this exception for international
terrorism would increase the United States's ability to more ade-
quately match its response to the September 11 attacks with the na-
ture of the terrorist threat facing U.S. national security. Thus, the
United States could legally seek out and disable the international ter-
rorist infrastructure that has proven itself to be quite potent.1 98
Calling for this exception to the proportionality doctrine is not to
take lightly international legal standards; rather it is a recognition of
the reality that is modern-day international terrorism. When Article
51 of the U.N. Charter was drafted in 1945 following the Second
World War, its drafters could not have envisioned that international
terrorist organizations would rise to the level of strength and sophisti-
cation that they possess today. 199 Because of this, the U.N. Charter
197 See generally DINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 192-213 (describing in detail self-defense in
response to an armed attack by a state).
198 This is not to suggest, of course, that the United States has free reign to use exces-
sive or unreasonable force against terrorist targets:
[T]he use of force, as with the theory of self-defense, must be proportional.
It can be sufficient to eliminate the threat, with perhaps some room to
spare, but it cannot be grossly disproportionate to the threat presented by
the terrorists. Further, in order for the use of force to be justified at all, the
threat must be a serious one; i.e., one that threatens the loss of life or very
substantial property damage.
Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Military Force, 18 Wis. INT'L
L.J. 145, 172 (2000).
The protections limiting collateral damage in uses of force under Protocol I of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 still apply under this exception. See Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1),June 8, 1977, arts. 48, 51-52, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
25-27 [hereinafter Protocol I to the Geneva Convention]. This proportionality exception
allows the United States the ability and flexibility to realistically answer the terrorist threat
with necessary measures, given the very elaborate and multinational structure of terrorist
organizations. See infra notes 203-04 and accompanying text. When combating interna-
tional terrorists, the United States may need to take action against terrorist cells located all
over the globe while receiving varying degrees of support for its actions from other states.
Note, however, that this analysis does not speculate about the proportionality of any of the
actual future uses of force taken by the United States against international terrorist targets.
Rather, this proposal is limited to stating that the proportionality exception promoted
herein would make it permissible under customary international law for the United States
to take necessary actions wherever and whenever it has a valid need to strike an interna-
tional terrorism-related target, so long as the target poses a credible and verifiable threat to
U.S. national security (an evaluation which has changed considerably in the post-Septem-
ber 11 world) and the action taken in response to that threat is not excessive.
199 Beard, supra note 192, at 559 ("When representatives of fifty countries assembled in
San Francisco in 1945 to draw up the United Nations Charter, modern threats of terrorism
such as those posed by the Al Qaeda terrorist network were not yet known."); Frederic L.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
was not designed to specifically address state responses to interna-
tional terrorist acts. 200 The best one can do is to apply by analogy,
when feasible, the principles of Article 51 self-defense to situations
involving international terrorism. However, the viability of such an
application very often breaks down, given that the type, scope, and
form of the threat posed by international terrorism is so vastly differ-
ent from that posed by a hostile state actor in the more traditional
sense envisioned by the U.N. Charter.20 1 Because the prevalence and
deadliness of international terrorism have grown enormously over the
past half century,20 2 international legal norms must now be rede-
signed to deal with the very real threat international terrorism
presents. Indeed, the very structure of international terrorist net-
works demonstrates the necessity of this alteration, given that their
effectiveness directly stems from their complex and clandestine na-
ture. 20 3 For example, a single international terrorist strike can be
planned in one country by terrorists hailing from a second country,
executed against targets in a third country by terrorists recruited in a
fourth country using weapons acquired in a fifth country that were
manufactured in a sixth country, and supplied by a diplomat from a
seventh, while financed with money from an eighth. 20 4 This example
demonstrates why the traditional notions of proportionality will not
be effective in addressing the problems and dangers posed by interna-
tional terrorism. Almost by definition, the War on Terrorism requires
the United States to follow the evidence of terrorist activity wherever it
leads, and then to determine a reasonable response to the threat once
the target is identified. More likely than not, the traditional notions
of proportionality, left unaltered, would not allow such an all-encom-
passing theater of operation.
Kirgis, The American Society of International Law (ASIL) Insights: Terrorist Attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon, at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm (Sept. 2001)
("If the party responsible for the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon is
not the government of the country from which the terrorists operate, a question could
arise whether use of armed force that causes injury to that country is lawful. The U.N.
Charter was not drafted with such situations in mind." (emphasis added)).
200 See id.
201 See supra note 5; infra note 229; see also John D. Moore, Intelligence, Policy and the New
Terror, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 167, 168 (2002) (reviewing PAUL R. PILLAR, TERRORISM
AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (2001)) (noting the "decentralized, networked nature of Islamic
terrorism," Moore states that "[u]nlike the hierarchical structures ... of state military and
security structures [and] mid-twentieth century guerrilla and Leftist-Marxist terrorist
groups, actors such as AI-Qaeda are correctly characterized as either one or a group of
nodes representing only a portion of the threat").
202 See infra note 239.
203 See Campbell, supra note 152, at 1072-73.
204 See id.
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Perhaps the strongest rationale supporting this proportionality
exception is the threat of future terrorist attacks. 20 5 Unfortunately,
September 11 may not be an isolated incident, 20 6 and a policy of inac-
tion in the face of that possibility would simply be unacceptable for
any U.S. administration after September 11.207 Though there are no
fail-safe assurances, U.S. policymakers must take steps to prevent fu-
ture large-scale terrorist attacks.208 There is evidence that the very
real and ongoing threat of terrorism has become a daily reality. For
example, if not for the quick actions of the flight attendants aboard
American Airlines flight 63 en route from Paris, France to Miami,
Florida, the alleged "shoe bomber," Richard Reid, might have suc-
ceeded in his plot to destroy that aircraft.209 In addition, officials in
the Bush Administration have warned that, despite U.S. successes in
Afghanistan, "terrorists may be operating in the United States, requir-
ing the nation to stay on high alert for perhaps years. "210 And further-
more, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld stated that the
United States must be ready to sustain terrorist attacks even worse
than those suffered on September 11.21i Secretary Rumsfeld warned,
"In the years ahead, it is likely we will be surprised again"; and moreo-
ver, "These attacks could grow vastly more deadly than those we suf-
205 See infta notes 209-13. In his 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush
highlighted the continuing terrorist threat:
Our discoveries in Afghanistan confirmed our worst fears and showed us
the true scope of the task ahead.... We have found diagrams of American
nuclear power-plants and public water facilities, detailed instructions for
making chemical weapons, surveillance maps of American cities, and thor-
ough descriptions of landmarks in America and throughout the world.
President's State of the Union Address, supra note 14, at 134.
206 See Beard, supra note 192, at 587-88 ("[T]he September 11 terrorist attacks [were
not] isolated acts. Rather, they were part of an on-going terrorist campaign over many
years that has been directed by the Al Qaeda terrorist network against the United States,
and it is a campaign which Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders have insisted must and will con-
tinue until America capitulates or is destroyed." (citations omitted)).
207 When asked whether she thought that the Clinton Administration's decision to
strike Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998 might backfire and spur radical groups to use more
acts of terrorism, Clinton Secretary of State Madeline Albright responded, "While our ac-
tions are not perfect insurance [against future terrorism], inaction would be an invitation
to further horror." Art Pine, U.S. Targets Heart of Terror, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at Al
(alteration in original); see also Clinton, supra note 144, at 1461 ("But of this, I am also sure:
The risks from inaction to America and the world would be far greater than action.").
208 In his January 29, 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush said:
[A]II nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our
Nation's security .... Time and distance from the events of September the
lth will not make us safer unless we act on its lessons. America is no
longer protected by vast oceans. We are protected from attack only by vig-
orous action abroad and increased vigilance at home.
President's State of the Union Address, supra note 14, at 135-36.
209 See Thomas B. Edsall, Passenger Subdued on Plane: Bomb Fears Prompt Incident over At-
lantic, WASH. PosT, Dec. 23, 2001, at Al.
210 AP News Capsules, GOODtAND DAILY NEws (Goodland, Kan.), Feb. 1, 2002, at 7.
211 SeeJohn Diamond, Bush Teams Seeks Boost for Defense, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 1, 2002, at 1.
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fered [on September 11]."212 Thus the threat of terrorism in the
United States is very real and very substantial, and it will exist for quite
some time.213
Every aspect of the September 11 attacks-including the fact that
they were on U.S. soil, their element of surprise, their alarming so-
phistication and precision, and the unprecedented level of violence
that they achieved-signals that international terrorism is a serious
threat to U.S. national security. However, pursuing the War on Ter-
rorism to the full extent that the Bush Administration believes is war-
ranted will be, in the opinion of many observers, viewed as
disproportionate and in violation of international law.2 14 Some may
fear that this proposed alteration of international law is a slippery
212 ld.
213 SeeJohn Diamond, Spy Chiefs: Al Qaeda Is Still a Threat, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 7, 2002, at 12
("'We know that terrorists have considered attacks in the U.S. against high-profile govern-
ment or private facilities,"' said CIA Director George Tenet. "'We know that they will hurt
us again, [and w]e have to minimize their ability to do so, because there is no such thing as
perfect security in this business.' ");James Risen & Patrick E. Tyler, Interview with Bin Laden
Makes the Rounds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at B5 (reporting that Osama bin Laden, in his
only television interview since the war in Afghanistan began, declared that "'the battle has
been moved inside America, and we shall continue until we win this battle"'); Nic Robert-
son, Bomb-Making Video Reveals Scope of Al Qaeda Threat, CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.com/
2002/US/08/21/terror.tape.main/index.html (Aug. 21, 2002) ("An al Qaeda videotape
obtained by CNN shows a level of sophistication in bomb making that would allow ter-
rorists to arrive in a target city unarmed and easily put together high-explosive devices
[from scratch] to carry out destructive attacks, experts who saw the tapes say.").
214 See, e.g., Head, supra note 65, at 7 ("[T]he campaign that President Bush has an-
nounced has other aims that extend well beyond self-defense for the United States." (cita-
tion omitted)); Harold Hongju Koh, The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT'L LJ. 23, 27 (2002)
("The newly announced Bush Doctrine of declaring 'war' on global terrorist networks and
the states who harbor them fits awkwardly with the positivistic, state-centric, U.N. Charter-
focused understanding of the use of force that dominates international law."); Paust, supra
note 192, at 29; Tom J. Farer, Comment, Beyond the Charter Frame: Unilaterism or Condomin-
ium, 96 Am. J. INT'L L. 359, 360 (2002) ("The Bush Doctrine, to the extent it implies
unilateral action, cannot be contained within the U.N. Charter norms that have served as
the framework of international relations for the past half century. It challenges a root
principle of the Charter system-namely, the formal equality of states." (emphasis omit-
ted)); Jonathan Steele, The Bush Doctrine Makes Nonsense of the UN Charter, THE GUARDIAN,
June 7, 2002, at 18, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/bush/story/
0,7369,728870,00.html; B. Welling Hall, American Society of International Law (ASIL) Insights,
Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon: Addendum Relating to Self-Defense, at
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm (Sept. 2001) ("[T]he suggested policy of hold-
ing entire nations accountable for the acts of a few would not appear to be lawful since
collective punishment would, by definition, entail the unnecessary suffering of innocent
populations."); Kirgis, supra note 199 ("International law issues could arise if ... the
United States or any of its allies takes countermeasures against a country suspected of har-
boring the persons responsible for the terrorist acts of September 11. The issues would be
particularly acute if the countermeasures are in the form of armed action."); Michael
Ratner &Jules Lobel, An Alternative to the US. Employment of Military Force, Center for Consti-
tutional Rights, available at http://www.humanrightsnow.org/alternative%20to%20
force.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2002) (arguing for alternatives to the use of military force to
prevent a unilateral and disproportionate U.S. response to the September 11 attacks); cf
Lobel, supra note 147, at 555 ("The legal justifications permitting nations to use force in
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slope, leading to creative justifications for uses of force that would
never have been allowed under the traditional norms. But this con-
cern only further accentuates the need for a clear and prompt articu-
lation of this modification to the proportionality doctrine. Such an
articulation would allow U.S. counter-terrorism policies to comply
with at least some rational-though novel-standard of international
law.
D. What the Proportionality Exception Would Look Like
Once the need for the exception to the proportionality doctrine
to combat international terrorism is established, it is necessary to de-
scribe how the exception would function in practice. Of course, no
all-encompassing description of the exception is possible, given that as
different situations arise, they will present unique challenges and con-
sequences. Nevertheless, the following hypothetical situations are
instructive.
For purposes of explanation, suppose the following scenario: The
sovereign nation of Harmony is the victim of a large-scale terrorist
attack perpetrated by a stateless international terrorist network known
as "La Pravus." After extensive investigation and reliable intelligence-
gathering, Harmony discovers a La Pravus terrorist training camp lo-
cated in a remote and isolated region of another sovereign nation,
Prytania. Harmony contacts the government of Prytania seeking its
support in eradicating the La Pravus terrorist operations within its ter-
ritory. Prytania, however, is sympathetic to the La Pravus organiza-
tion. There is no direct evidence that La Pravus members operate
within the Prytanian government, or vice-versa, but because the gov-
ernment supports La Pravus's cause, the government of Prytania casts
a blind eye toward La Pravus's operations on its soil. As a result, the
Prytanians obstruct and delay any entreaties by Harmony to root out
La Pravus in Prytania.
Under currently existing international legal norms, as pro-
nounced by the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) in the Corfu
Channel case of 1949, no state is permitted to "'knowingly [allow] its
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States."' 215
The I.C.J. further held, in the Tehran case of 1980,216 that if the gov-
ernment of a state completely fails to take the appropriate steps to
protect the interests of another state, so long as it has the capacity to
do so, as required under international law, then that inactive state
response to terrorist attacks are premised on the efficacy of such military strikes.... How-
ever, the efficacy of such military strikes is as suspect as their legality.").
215 DINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 214 (citing Corfu Channel Case (Merits), 1949 I.C.J. 4,
22 (Apr. 9)).
216 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
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bears an international responsibility to the other state.21 7 Thus, "If a
host country permits the use of its territory as a staging area for terror-
ist attacks when it could shut those operations down, and refuses re-
quests to take action, the host government cannot expect to insulate its
territory against measures of self-defense."' 2 18 In connection with this point,
Dinstein notes that just as one state has the right to exercise self-de-
fense against an armed attack by another state, it is equally entitled to
defend itself against attacks originating from armed bands or ter-
rorists operating from within the territory of another state.219 There-
fore, in this situation, Harmony is entitled to take matters into its own
hands and eradicate the La Pravus operations within Prytania.
In the second scenario, Harmony again discovers a La Pravus ter-
rorist cell operating in Prytania. This time, however, the government
of Prytania may or may not support the La Pravus cause and may or
may not be aware of the La Pravus operations within its territory. But,
either way, Prytania is too weak or otherwise incapable of terminating
La Pravus's activities within its borders, despite its genuine attempts or
desires to do so. 220 In this situation, Prytania's international responsi-
bility to Harmony resulting from the terrorist attacks is nominal.22'
However, that fact in no way dictates that Harmony must quietly en-
dure violent terrorist attacks simply because no sovereign state can be
held responsible. 222 Therefore, just as in the first scenario, Harmony
is entitled to exercise its right to self-defense against La Pravus within
the territory of Prytania.
At first glance these scenarios may seem to solve the problems
facing the United States in its War on Terrorism. However, as noted
217 See DINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 214 (citing Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. at 32-33, 44).
218 Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against Bin Laden, 24 YALE J.
INT'L. L. 559, 565 (1999) (emphasis added).
If a host state is unable or unwilling to curtail harmful private conduct
when that conduct originates from within the host state's territory, it makes
no sense to insist that the victim state remain indifferent to such conduct,
effectively sacrificing the integrity of its own territorial sovereignty for that
of the host state.
Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'v 539, 550 (2002).
219 See DINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 216.
This is an extraordinary case demanding, and getting, an extraordinary so-
lution in international law. Article 51 permits [a State] to resort to self-
defence in response to an armed attack. [That State] may, therefore, dis-
patch military units into [another State's] territory, in order to destroy the
bases of the hostile armed bands or terrorists (provided that the destruc-
tion of the bases is the 'sole object' of the expedition). When [a State]
takes these measures, it does what [the other State] itself should have done,
had it possessed the means and disposition to perform its duty.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
220 See id. at 215.
221 See id.
222 See id.
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by Dinstein, in both scenarios under the traditional norms of interna-
tional law, the right to act self-defensively within the territory of an-
other state is regulated by the principles emanating from Webster's
Caroline doctrine. 223 Under those conditions, not only would the
need to infringe upon the sovereignty of another state have to be
manifest, but the reaction would also have to be immediately responsive
to an armed attack already committed by the terrorist organization,
and not simply anticipatory of a future threat.22 4 Furthermore, a re-
peat attack from the particular terrorist cell targeted must be ex-
pected, 225 and the amount of force used in response must be roughly
equivalent, or proportional, to the precipitating terrorist attack.226
These conditions, however, simply cannot be applied successfully
to the modern realities of international terrorism. 227 For one, the re-
quirement that any actions taken against an international terrorist tar-
get be strictly in response to an armed attack that already occurred
and originated from the particular location to be struck is an impossi-
ble standard, owing to the nature and structure of international ter-
rorist networks. For example, the United States was able to identify
Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda terrorist network as mastermind-
ing the September 11 attacks.228 However, the evidence indicates that
the actual planning and training of the terrorists who took part in that
223 See id. at 219 ("Although Webster's prose was inclined to overstatement, the three
conditions of necessity, proportionality and immediacy can easily be detected in it. These
conditions are now regarded as pertinent to all categories of self-defence.").
224 See id.
225 See id.
226 See id. at 184 ("It is perhaps best to consider the demand for proportionality in the
province of self-defence as a standard of reasonableness in the response to force by
counter-force.").
227 Professor Beard argues:
Webster's comments in the Caroline dispute were ... related to the stan-
dards applicable to a state launching a preemptive strike or engaging in a
form of anticipatory self-defense and cannot be relied on to establish a rule
prohibiting a state from responding with force to repulse and end on-going
acts of aggression after that state has been the target of repeated attacks
and faces a near certainty that more attacks will follow. In fact, an unneces-
sarily strict or overly broad reading of the necessity requirement could pro-
hibit almost all 'after the fact' acts of self-defense except those that are
immediately necessary to repel an attack or prevent being overwhelmed.
Such a strict and self-defeating version of necessity expansively based on the
Caroline test does not appear to be consistent with the right of self-defense
under customary international law and has been vigorously opposed by a
number of writers, particularly in the context of fighting terrorism. Simi-
larly, an overly broad or strict reading of proportionality, which would re-
quire a state's armed response in self-defense to be in exact proportion to
the attack suffered, is not consistent with customary international law, par-
ticularly in relation to attacks received during an on-going conflict.
Beard, supra note 192, at 585-86.
228 See infra note 244.
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operation occurred in terrorist cells all over the world,229 and even in
locations within the United States.2 30 Therefore, how else could the
United States possibly respond against the particular location from
which the terrorist attack originated without using its various methods
(some of them military) to hunt down and strike against the entire
worldwide al Qaeda network? The obvious first target was Afghani-
stan, but there are clearly countless other al Qaeda targets located
within the territories of states around the globe.231 The same is true
for the repetition requirement. Again owing to the structure of inter-
national terrorist organizations, it is virtually impossible for the
United States to know exactly which one of the worldwide terrorist
cells will attempt to strike next; therefore, they must all be considered
targets. 232 Indeed, it is likely that large-scale attacks, like September
11, require a great deal of coordination between a number of terrorist
cells. 233 The same is also true for the requirement that a response to a
threat not be purely anticipatory. International terrorist networks are
229 See, e.g., Douglas Frantz & Desmond Butler, Sept. 11 Attack Planned in '99, Germans
Learn, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2002, at Al.
German authorities said today that the Qaeda cell in Hamburg identified
the World Trade Center as a target more than a year before two hijacked
airliners were flown into the New York City landmarks... . "Besides sharing
ideological and military training, the members of the cell coordinated with
the international network on the details of the attack and the logistical sup-
port," [Germany's top prosecutor,] Mr. [Kay] Nehm said.
Id.; Peter Finn, German Officials Link Hijackers to Al Qaeda Group, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2001,
at Al (noting that a German project "collected a trove of intelligence about a network of
individuals and groups in Germany" and "the analysis of the information led to ... Ca-
nada, the U.S. and other European countries such as Britain, France and Italy" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Terry McDermott, The Plot: How Terrorists Hatched a Simple Plan
to Use Planes as Bombs, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2002, at S1 ("A small group of men spread across
the globe was assigned the task .... ").
230 See Amy Goldstein, Hijackers Led by Core Group: Suspects Left Trail of Movements in U.S.
Through Licenses, Rentals, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2001, at Al (noting that the September 11
terrorists lived in Florida, New Jersey, California, and other locations throughout the
United States); Major Garrett, Bush Upset by INS Visas to Hijackers, Aide Says, CNN.com, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/03/13/Bush.INS/index.html (Mar. 13, 2002)
("Mohammed Atta, 33, and Marwan AI-Shehhi, 23, learned to fly at Huffman Aviation in
Venice Florida, in July 2000 and were aboard separate flights that struck the World Trade
Center towers.").
231 There are thousands of [al Qaeda] terrorists in more than 60 countries.
They are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods and brought
to camps in places like Afghanistan, where they are trained in the tactics of
terror. They are [then] sent back to their homes or sent to hide in coun-
tries around the world to plot [terrorist attacks].
President's Address to Joint Session of Congress, supra note 2, at 1348; see also infra note
236 (discussing the al Qaeda-linked terrorist cells in the Philippines).
232 See Michele L. Malvesti, Bombing bin Laden: Assessing the Effectiveness of Air Strikes as a
Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 17, 27 (2002) ("[The counter-terror-
ism strikes in Afghanistan] are unlikely to be sufficient in undermining bin Laden's ability
to conduct future acts of terror because the strikes are unlikely, by themselves, to destroy
the critical nodes in his terrorist infrastructure.").
233 See supra text accompanying note 204.
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obviously quite serious about conducting terrorist strikes, but, unlike
dealings between hostile nations, the opportunity to use negotiation
or diplomatic methods for resolving disputes is almost never an op-
tion. Nor can U.N.-imposed sanctions (whether social234 or eco-
nomic) or embargoes effectively break a multistate terrorist
organization's will to commit indiscriminate and unpredictable at-
tacks. Therefore, the only way to effectively address a terrorist threat
is through proactive engagement. Under what logical paradigm
should a state be required by international law to wait for an attack
that is virtually certain to come, when reasonable steps can be taken to
prevent that attack from ever occurring? 235 With regard to the re-
quirement of rough equivalence in the amount of force used, it would
be futile to attempt to make a logical connection between the amount
of damage inflicted on September 11 with the damage caused by mul-
tiple U.S. strikes in their various forms (e.g., financial or military) and
severity (e.g., the campaign in Afghanistan or the involvement in the
234 SeeJORGE CASTANEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 12 (Alba
Amoia trans., 1969). Castafieda describes the phenomenon of international "social sanc-
tioning" as follows:
[An international organization's] adoption of a recommendation repre-
sents an expression of a general social feeling. It is a manifestation of the
manner in which the purposes of the treaty must be fulfilled in the eyes of
the organization. The member who does not observe it is opposing not
only a social consensus but also the juridical system that is the normative
superstructure of that social environment. The pressure that a recommen-
dation brings to bear on its addressees means this: faced with conduct con-
trary to the recommendation, and to the extent to which it is contrary, the
social group can act, in its turn, against the asocial conduct of whomsoever
does not carry out the recommendation, directing it reprobation against
the author of the conduct. This is the social sanction of recommendations.
The essential element in this ingenious theoretical construction is not so
much the nonfulfillment of the recommendation in itself as the reaction of
the group against the divergent attitude of the delinquent recipient.
Id. Social sanctioning would have no effect on an international terrorist organization, due
in large part to the fact that such organizations, like al Qaeda, have no representation at
the U.N. Nor, for that matter, did the Taliban.
235 See President's State of the Union Address, supra note 14, at 135 ("I will not wait on
events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer."); Beard,
supra note 192, at 589 ("In the face of such serious attacks and continuing threats [from
international terrorist organizations], international law and the United Nations Charter
cannot require a passive defense in response."); Prime Minister Tony Blair, Prime Minister's
Statement on Military Action in Afghanistan, 10 Downing Street Newsroom, at http://
www.number-10.gov.uk/news.asp?NewsId=2692 (Oct. 9, 2001) ("The world understands
that whilst, of course, there are dangers in acting the dangers of inaction are far, far
greater. The threat of further such outrages, the threat to our economies, the threat to the
stability of the world."). Former U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz also noted: "A
nation attacked by terrorists is permitted to use force to prevent or preempt future at-
tacks .... The U.N. Charter is not a suicide pact. The law is a weapon on our side, and it
is up to us to use it to its maximum extent." Low Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity,
86 DEP'T STATE BULL., Mar. 1986, at 15, 17 (emphasis added).
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fight against terrorist groups in the Philippines236), depending on the
threat presented and the level of international support for U.S. ef-
forts. In addition-and this is where the breakdown of the traditional
notions of proportionality most strongly comes into play-Professor
Dinstein's discussion of self-defense in response to a terrorist attack
coming from within a state does not appear to envision multiple ac-
tions against targets within the territories of multiple states occurring
over an extended period of time, actions that are necessary to combat
modern international terrorism successfully.23 7
Returning to the hypothetical scenarios between Harmony and
Prytania: What if many months, or even years, have passed between
the time of the precipitating attack and the responsive attack it gener-
ated? And what if there is not one Prytania, but many Prytanias, all
with varying levels of La Pravus activity and Prytanian support for
those activities, requiring many different responsive strikes, possibly
separated by significant lapses of time? That scenario is more analo-
gous to the situation currently confronting the United States. And
that scenario necessitates a relaxation of the rules, requiring the pro-
portionality limitation regulating the right to self-defense to become
more elastic with regard to combating international terrorism. Under
the Caroline rules of self-defense, engaging in multiple actions in mul-
tiple locations across the globe in response to a single terrorist attack,
with some of those responsive actions occurring years after that attack,
would not be considered proportionate to the precipitating attack.238
Yet, extreme situations call for extreme measures, and the United
States must take steps to avoid more terrorist strikes similar to those of
September 11. Furthermore, considering that modern-day interna-
tional terrorists have the potential to inflict an almost unthinkable
236 See Eric Schmitt, U.S. and Philippines Setting Up Joint Operations to Fight Terror, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at Al (discussing U.S. military action in the Philippines).
237 See generally DINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 213-21. However, Dinstein states earlier in
the book:
Immediacy signifies that there must not be an undue time-lag between the
armed attack and the exercise of self-defence. However, this condition is
construed "broadly". Lapse of time is almost unavoidable when-in a de-
sire to fulfill letter and spirit the condition of necessity-a tedious process
of diplomatic negotiations evolves, with a view to resolving the matter
amicably.
Id. at 184 (citations omitted). However, this language does not seem to grant as reasonable
the lapse of many years between an attack and responses to that attack considering that,
generally speaking from historical examples, international terrorist organizations have not
employed diplomatic means to negotiate the peaceful settlement of disputes with the
United States, nor vice-versa.
238 See id. at 219-20. Compare the United States's current and proposed plans for the
campaign against international terrorism with the events that precipitated them: The at-
tacks of September 11 occurred on only one day and successfully targeted three U.S.
buildings.
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amount of loss of life, 23 9 as evidenced by the September 11 attacks,240
the need for a relaxation of the traditional norms for the purpose of
combating international terrorism becomes all the more clear.
In the most extreme situations in which every level of the govern-
ment of a sovereign nation is infiltrated by members of a terrorist or-
ganization, and when that government is complicit in virtually all of
the activities of the terrorist organization, then that government, as
well as the terrorist organization it harbors, should be considered hos-
tile and a potential target in the U.S. response against international
terrorism. This, of course, is the case of the Taliban and al Qaeda in
Afghanistan.2 41 However, it is unlikely that there exist any other simi-
larly extreme examples of complete state support for a terrorist organ-
ization such as existed under the Taliban.242 If, however, a sovereign
nation turns a blind eye toward terrorist cells operating within its terri-
tory or tacitly supports the terrorists (without the terrorist organiza-
239 The disintegration of many states in the post-Cold War period, and the
Cold War legacy of a world awash in advanced conventional weapons and
know-how, has assisted the proliferation of terrorism worldwide. Combined
with the increasing ease of transnational transportation and communica-
tion, and the presence of states and non-state actors to provide financial,
material, and operational support, the lethal potential of terrorist violence
has reached new heights.
Moore, supra note 201, at 168.
240 See, e.g., Jim Dwyer et al., Fighting to Live as the Towers Died, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2002,
at Al (stating that, at the time the article was written, there were 2,823 individuals believed
dead as a result of the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York City alone).
241 See Beard, supra note 192, at 582 ("In regard to the link between Al Qaeda and the
Taliban Regime, the U.N. Security Council has on numerous occasions made the Taliban's
clear and established support of terrorist networks a subject of concern and condemna-
tion."); Johanna McGeary, The Taliban Troubles, TIME, Oct. 1, 2001, at 36, 42 ("[Tlhe
Taliban found an enthusiastic new benefactor [in Osama bin Laden].... In exchange for
a haven in Afghanistan's switchback valleys and rugged passes, bin Laden offered the
Taliban money and fighters."); Walter Rodgers: Radicals Believe in Bin Laden, CNN.com, Oct.
3, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/10/03/ret.rodgers.otsc/
index.html ("Taliban Supreme Leader Mullah Mohammed Omar has asked his people to
prepare for a 'holy war' against the United States, just a day after Taliban leaders indicated
that they want to negotiate with the United States over the American demand to turn over
Osama bin Laden."). But see Paust, supra note 192 (manuscript at 12). Paust argues:
[T]he U.S. attacks on the Taliban in 2001 and the arrest or detention of
members of the Taliban armed forces (as opposed to bin Laden and al
Qaeda) [are] highly problematic. From what is publicly known, the
Taliban did not send bin Laden's operatives abroad to attack the U.S., con-
trol and direct bin Laden's attacks on the U.S. and its nationals, knowingly
finance the attacks, or otherwise directly participate in the attacks.
Id.
242 The record in the U.N. Security Council ... supports the finding that no
government has been as universally condemned by the international com-
munity for its support of terrorism and so closely linked with terrorist activi-
ties as the Taliban Regime of Afghanistan. With this status comes a more
easily assigned and more certain international legal responsibility for the
horrific attacks on the United States of September 11 and a clearer case for
self-defense under Article 51.
Beard, supra note 192, at 583.
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tion actually being involved with official government functions), then
the United States should have the legal option of addressing that ter-
rorist threat.
It is illogical to allow terrorist camps and cells to fester and
grow-only to strike at them after the terrorists have already at-
tacked-if indeed the United States is aware of their existence before-
hand. 243 Cooperation should be sought from the nations within
which terrorist organizations operate. However, if that cooperation is
not forthcoming, the United States should not be afraid to act in its
self-interest. After the events of September 11, the United States
should not simply wait to become the victim of yet another terrorist
attack before deciding to act. By virtue of necessity, the U.S. right to
self-defense in the context of combating international terrorism will
and should exist long into the future. Finally, to conclude this illustra-
tion of the proportionality exception, it is important to note that, as
with all uses of force, use of this proportionality exception would be
legal only after obtaining sufficient and credible evidence to validate
and verify all targets as legitimate sources of international terrorist
activities.2 44
E. Fighting Terrorism While Avoiding Anarchy in the
International System
As previously stated, many commentators may believe that with
the military strikes in Afghanistan, the United States has once again
moved beyond the permissible bounds of Article 51 of the U.N. Char-
ter.245 As with past U.S. uses of force in response to terrorism, many
may criticize U.S. officials' claims that the U.S. response to September
11 fits within Article 51 self-defense, and argue that in reality the U.S.
243 See supra note 235.
244 See generally Lobel, supra note 147, at 547 ("Given the potential for abuse of the
right of national self-defense, international law must require that a nation meet a clear and
stringent evidentiary standard designed to assure the world community that an ongoing
terrorist attack is in fact occurring before the attacked nation responds with force.");
Scheideman, supra note 142 (arguing for thorough and reliable decision making based on
substantial and credible evidence for the selection of targets in the War on Terrorism) .
The United States claimed it had sufficient and credible information to warrant the
strikes on al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. See, e.g., Suzanne Daley, NATO Quickly
Gives the U.S. All the Help that It Asked, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2001, at B6 ("[T]he United States
briefed its allies on its investigation, and NATO agreed that there was 'clear and compel-
ling evidence' that Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization were behind the at-
tacks."); John Diamond, U.S. to Detail Case Against Bin Laden, CH. TRIs., Sept. 24, 2001, at 1
(reporting that "U.S. intelligence and law-enforcement officials are preparing documents
that ... would show ... that ... Osama bin laden and his Al Qaeda network planned and
carried out the terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon," and that Secretary of
State Colin Powell said, "'I am absolutely convinced that the Al Qaeda network ... was
responsible for this attack."').
245 See supra notes 175-79, 183.
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response does not seem to conform to the traditional equation. To
attempt such justification may very well resemble the official U.S. justi-
fications for the 1998 cruise missile strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan,
and the 1986 bombing of Libya. However, given the depth and
breadth of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, it may be an even
harder sell for U.S. policymakers this time around; unlike the bomb-
ing of Libya and the cruise missile strikes, the broad and far-reaching
War on Terrorism may eventually take the United States so far beyond
the U.N. Charter's vision for the maintenance of international peace
and security246 that the'international system may never be able to re-
turn to its stasis of the past.2 47 This is because the United States is
currently writing, unilaterally, its own doctrine for combating interna-
tional terrorism: a doctrine of zero toleranc248 for international terror-
ism in all its manifestations and combating it wherever it is found.249
However, the Bush Administration has yet to clearly spell out the ef-
fects of this new doctrine on current international law, and how the
doctrine might alter those norms.250 Given how fragile the interna-
tional system can be, it is incumbent upon the Bush Administration to
explain to the rest of the world that this zero tolerance policy, this
deviation from the norm, is strictly limited to the narrow exception of
international terrorism. Though the United States does want the free-
dom to conduct its fight against terrorism, it should also want to do so
without causing the collapse of the entire international legal structure
that regulates the international use of force.
Many international legal scholars have argued in the past for a
necessary alteration of the rules regulating the use of force precisely
to address the threat of international terrorism.251 The mandate of
246 See supra note 82.
247 See Koh, supra note 214, at 27; Malvesti, supra note 232, at 27 ("The current
[counter-terrorism] strikes contrast sharply with those of the past in terms of length and
scope."); Farer, supra note 214, at 360.
248 See President's Address to Joint Session of Congress, supra note 2, at 1349 ("Every
nation in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with
the terrorists."); Farer, supra note 214, at 359 ("The subtext of the president's [January
2002 State of the Union Address] was that the United States was going to hunt down and
eliminate terrorists wherever they might be found .... And [the U.S.] was prepared to act
preemptively rather than simply as a response to an actual or imminent armed attack.").
249 See President's State of the Union Address, supra note 14, at 134 ("What we have
found in Afghanistan confirms that, far from ending there, our war against terror is only
beginning."); GLOBAL WAR, supra note 156, at 7 (quoting President Bush from September
19, 2001: "The message to every country is, there will be a campaign against terrorist activ-
ity, a worldwide campaign"(emphasis added)); supra note 168.
250 See Byers, supra note 192, at 406 ("Today, the question arises as to whether the right
of self-defense extends to military responses to terrorist acts, particularly since most such
responses will violate the territorial integrity of a State that is not itself directly
responsible.").
251 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 73, at 47; Malawer, supra note 135, at 102; Sofaer, supra
note 116, at 90; Travalio, supra note 198, at 172.
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September 11 dictates that the time has come for the United States to
officially and openly defend its response to terrorism as a now-permis-
sible exception to the more traditional notions of the right to self-
defense. 252 An alternative response that does not include an explana-
tion by the United States of this doctrinal shift might have the unset-
tling effect of inadvertently advocating a wholesale abandonment of
the proportionality doctrine, a result that runs the risk of seriously
undermining respect for the U.N. Charter system. 253 If the United
States, which is in many respects the flag-bearer of the United Nations,
does not respect the core principles of the U.N. Charter, then why
should any other states?254 Despite many of its own questionable uses
of force, the United States-as the remaining hegemon-does desire
that the rest of the world abide by the U.N.'s rules regulating uses of
force and strive to stay within the bounds of international law.25 5 But
if the United States does not clarify its actions in response to Septem-
ber 11, and other states feel as though proportionality is no longer a
requirement for the use of force, what incentive will remain to keep
these states on the straight and narrow path? The eventual outcome
252 Cf Koh, supra note 214, at 23-24 ("[W]e must acknowledge that September 11 is a
tragedy potentially momentous enough to reshape the very architecture of the domestic
and international legal system developed in the wake of World War II.").
253 See infra note 256.
254 International law protects the fundamental interests of states and their citi-
zens from abuse by actors in the international system. . . . When [the
United States] disregard[s] customary international law ... [the United
States] will suffer the consequences of the precedents [it] create [s]. As Os-
car Schachter has commented, once [the United States] make[s] decisions
about the use of force, those decisions "become part of the law-shaping
process, influencing expectations as to the acceptability of future actions
influencing use of force."
J ..justice Brandeis, . . .who foresaw the consequences of [treating
international law lightly, said:] "In a government of laws, existence of the
government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously....
If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it
invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."
Brennan, supra note 137, at 1222-23 (citations omitted).
255 Surprisingly, nations typically do try to comply with the international law norms
regulating the use of force, despite the fact that there exists no direct enforcement mecha-
nism, as demonstrated by the following:
[I1nternational law and institutions have often appeared powerless to
control either interstate or internal armed conflicts.
At the same time, states using force almost invariably seek to justify
their actions with reference to international law. They may invoke the right
of self-defense, or claim the consent of an affected state, or offer some
other legal justification. No state denies the authority of international law
governing the use of force, even if many states on occasion seek to reinter-
pret or evade that law.
JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 826 (2002).
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of such abuse would be the systematic and incremental degradation of
the U.N.'s legitimacy in regulating international armed conflict.25 6
Such an outcome would promote the already far too prevalent
view that anarchy rules the international system. As one scholar
noted, " [W] hile domestic politics functions under a system of author-
ity, global politics is anarchic. There is no central authority to deter-
mine how nations should act toward one another and unilaterally
enforce rules for such interactions."257 However, states have long
been attempting to avoid anarchy in the international system:
From the seventeenth century onward, systematic efforts have been
made to establish some form of authority in the international sys-
tem in the hope that doing so might facilitate peace and coopera-
tion among nations. International law and organizations are
manifestations of this hope, and.., they attempt to make the inter-
national system less anarchic.258
The most important of these international organizations commit-
ted to the furtherance of peace and order in the international realm
is, of course, the United Nations. However, it is questionable whether
the United Nations could generate the consensus required to pass
binding resolutions authorizing actions more tangible than mere con-
demnations of terrorist activities.259
1. The Current Shift in State Practice
To solve this dilemma, one possible option for U.S. policymakers
would be to use their leverage to advocate for a revision or rewording
of Article 51, allowing for greater leeway in uses of force to combat
international terrorism. However, it need not be stated just how time-
consuming and controversial such an undertaking would be, not to
mention the undoubtedly low probability of success in that endeavor.
Yet it appears that the United States is saved from that struggle, owing
to the widespread evidence of a developing shift in state practice re-
garding the U.S. War on Terrorism. As Frederic L. Kirgis observed in
an article for The American Society of International Laur
256 See Brennan, supra note 137 at 1222-23; David Wippman, NATO's Bombing of Kosovo
Under International Law: Kosovo and the Limits of International Law, 25 FoRDiAM INT'L L.J.
129, 145-46 (2001); cf Lobel, supra note 147, at 557 ("The current Clinton Administration
policy to disregard the limits set by international law in dealing with such nations as Iraq
and Sudan can only have the long-run effect of undermining respect for the U.N.
Charter.").
257 SPIEGEL, supra note 35, at 388-89.
258 Id. at 389.
259 See G.A. Res 158, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 513-14, U.N. Doc. A/15
(2001); G.A. Res. 1, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/56 (2001);
S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., at 1-4, U.N. Doc. S/REs/1373 (2001);
S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/REs/1368 (2001).
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The United States has relied on its right of self-defense in using
military force to respond to the September 11 attacks. Other gov-
ernments have not challenged the right of the United States to do
so . . . . Because customary international law is often developed
through a process of official assertions and acquiescences, the ab-
sence of challenge to the U.S. asserted right of self-defense could be
taken to indicate acquiescence in an expansion of the right to in-
clude defense against governments that harbor or support organ-
ized terrorist groups that commit armed attacks in other
countries. 2 60
Indeed, Professor Kirgis is not alone in this belief. A number of
commentators have noted the international community's wide sup-
port for U.S. actions post-September 11,261 including the observation
260 Kirgis, supra note 68.
261 On September 12, 2001, in an unprecedented action, the North Atlantic Council of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) released a statement invoking the collec-
tive self-defense of all nineteen member nations of NATO by stating that, if the terrorist
attacks of September 11 were determined to be directed from abroad against the United
States, then those attacks "shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Wash-
ington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Eu-
rope or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." Press Release,
NATO, Statement by the North Atlantic Council (Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://
www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/pOl-124e.htm.
Widespread international support is also evidenced by U.N. Security Council Resolu-
tion 1373, adopted on September 28, 2001, which states in part:
Reaffirming [the Security Council's] unequivocal condemnation of the
terrorist attacks which took place in New York, Washington, D.C. and Penn-
sylvania ....
Reaffirming further that such acts, like any act of international terror-
ism, constitute a threat to international peace and security,
Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-de-
fence ....
Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security
caused by terrorist acts,
[and] [c]alls upon all States to . . . [c]ooperate . . . to prevent and
suppress terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts ....
S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., at 1-3, U.N. Doc. S/REs/1373
(2001) (emphasis added); see alsoJudith Miller, Remarks at the Cornell International Law
Journal Symposium on Terrorism: Implications of the Response to September 11, 2001 (Feb. 14,
2002) (transcript on file with author) ("The unity in the international community regard-
ing the legal basis for U.S. action has been quite remarkable .... [T]he overall interna-
tional agreement is that the U.S. had a proper legal basis for taking self-defensive
actions... in response to the deliberate attack[s] ... in NewYork and Washington, D.C.");
GLOBAL WAR supra note 156, at 8. The Coalition Information Centers note:
Since September 11, President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell
have built a worldwide coalition for the war against terrorism. . . . 136
countries have offered a range of military assistance .... The U.S. has re-
ceived 46 multilateral declarations of support from organizations .... 89
countries have granted over-flight authority for U.S. military aircraft .... 76
countries have granted landing rights for U.S. military aircraft.... 23 coun-
tries have agreed to host U.S. forces involved in offensive operations.
Id. at 8; see also Steele, supra note 214. Steele states:
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that states' acceptance of U.S. actions will, in effect, condone the use
of anticipatory self-defense to fight international terrorism. 262
2. The Formation of Customary International Law
This shift has the potential to be of immeasurable significance.
Customary international law, defined as the unwritten body of rules or
norms derived from the practice and opinion of states, 263 need not
take long to develop, so long as a particular practice of states is uni-
The U.N. security council gave the U.S. approval to take military action
against the assumed perpetrators [of the September 11 attacks] under Arti-
cle 51.... Washington was therefore entitled to strike back in self-defence.
The argument is controversial, but unless it is challenged by a substantial
number of states it will stand as a legitimate new interpretation of interna-
tional law.
Id. Furthermore, Professor Beard states:
The European Union . . . . along with its member states individually,
pledged to support U.S. action against terrorism. Similar views and various
offers of support were made by America's Pacific allies, including Australia,
New Zealand, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea. In addition ....
numerous states throughout Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia expressed
their support for the U.S. military response to the September 11 terrorist
attacks.
While public opinion in the Arab and Muslim world opposed the U.S.
action against Afghanistan, several Arab states such as Bahrain, Egypt, and
Jordan expressed support for the U.S. anti-terror campaign. Other Arab
states also made significant contributions to U.S. military efforts, including
Pakistan .... Saudi Arabia ... and Persian Gulf states such as Oman and
Kuwait ....
Beard, supra note 192, at 569-70 (citations omitted).
262 [T] here is relatively little support for a right of anticipatory self-defence, as
such, in present day customary international law-either generally or in
respect of terrorist acts.
This does not mean that this aspect of the law will remain unchanged. In
his letter [to the U.N. Security Council] of 7 October 2001, [U.S.] Ambassa-
dor [to the U.N.] Negroponte did more than invoke the right of self-de-
fence with regard to Afghanistan. He also wrote: "We may find that our
self-defense requires further actions with respect to other organisations and
other states." The U.S., in extending its claim beyond AI-Qaeda, is clearly
contemplating widespread military action of a pre-emptive character that it
wouldjustify as anticipatory self-defence. Negroponte's letter could be seen
as a step towards securing advanced support for an extension of the right of
self-defence to encompass this previously contested sphere. Indeed, the let-
ter attracted little in the way of protests from other States-an omission
that might, if continued in the face of action justified as anticipatory self-
defence-be regarded as evidence of acquiescence in yet another change
to customary international law.
Byers, supra note 192, at 411 (citations omitted). Many international legal scholars have
debated the validity of the right to anticipatory self-defense. See OSCAR SCHAcHTER, INTER-
NATIONAL LAw IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 186 (1991); Brennan, supra note 137, at 1197.
263 See Byers, supra note 192, at 401. The Encyclopaedic Dictionary of International
Law provides, in part, the following definition for "customary international law":
Art. 38(1) of the I.C.J. Statute directs the Court to apply, inter alia, "interna-
tional custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law" and such is
generally regarded as a source of international law and to consist in two
principal elements: a concordant practice of a number of States acquiesced
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for .264 When considerable tension exists between formal interna-
tional law and the practice of states, as has been the case after the
September 11 attacks, the international norms must eventually evolve
to reflect this new practice.2 65 And once customary international law
develops, that development can form a reinterpretation of U.N. Char-
ter law consistent with state practice. Professor Dinstein notes as an
example of this phenomenon the application of the requirements of
necessity and proportionality to Article 51 uses of force. 266 Therefore,
as this current shift in state practice emerges and forces the norms
regulating self-defense to become more elastic, customary interna-
tional law dictates a reinterpretation of Article 51 to include the ex-
ception to the proportionality limitation in the context of combating
international terrorism.267 Thus, no formal reworking of the lan-
guage of Article 51 is necessary so long as state practice holds. How-
ever, this shift is not to be taken lightly, for if left without boundaries,
in by others; and a conception that the practice is required by or consistent
with the prevailing law (the opiniojuris).
ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 10, at 81-82; see also
Wippman, supra note 256, at 135 ("International law rests fundamentally on State
practice.").
264 The Encyclopaedic Dictionary of International Law definition of "customary inter-
national law" continues: "As to the fact that, if the practice be uniform, the period during
which it has been followed need not necessarily be very long .... see the judgment of the
I.CJ. in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases." ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw, supra note 10, at 82. See also MALANCZUK, supra note 24, at 45 ("Customary law
has a built-in mechanism of change. If states are agreed that a rule should be changed, a
new rule of customary international law based on the new practice of states can emerge very
quickly. .. .") (emphasis added).
265 See Wippman, supra note 256, at 131 ("The authority of international law rests on a
reasonable congruence between formally articulated norms and State behavior; when the
two diverge too sharply, the former must adapt or lose their relevance.").
266 The International Court of Justice pointed out, in the Nicaragua case, that Article
51
"does not contain any specific rule whereby self-defence would warrant only
measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to re-
spond to it, a rule well established in customary international law." In its
1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
the Court-citing these words-added that "[t] he submission of the exer-
cise of the right of self-defence to the conditions of necessity and propor-
tionality is a rule of customary international law," but "[tihis dual condition
applies equally to Article 51 of the Charter, whatever the means of force
employed."
DINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 183 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
267 Cf. Beard, supra note 192, at 573.
The actions of the U.N. Security Council and the decisive, widespread, and
unprecedented actions and statements by states supporting the U.S. right of
self-defense against the September 11 terrorist attacks are compelling evi-
dence of the international community's assessment of the applicability of
Article 51 ... to America's new war on terror.
Id. Although Beard applies Article 51 to the U.S. response to the September 11 attacks
without qualification, the U.S. war against terrorism, as previously noted, does not seem to
fit comfortably within the traditional notion of Article 51 self-defense. Therefore, the Arti-
cle 51 that Beard speaks of must be one altered by the shift in customary international law.
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it has the potential to eat away at the fundamental principles of the
U.N. Charter that ensure peace and security in the world, and may go
beyond the desired revisions allowing for a more effective campaign
against international terrorism.268
Terrorism is a horror that plagues many nations. As such, the
great danger is, as stated by one commentator in relation to the 1998
cruise missile strikes in Sudan and Afghanistan, "If every country
claimed the right to strike back [as the United States did], the world
might soon descend into anarchy."269 Indeed, some observers, even
as prominent as New York's former Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
believe that we've been heading in that direction for a long time:
"' [T] here has been a steady erosion of the active conviction that law is
the basis on which we conduct our foreign affairs." 270 The United
States must do what it can to avoid this outcome. The United States
should pursue international terrorism, but it is in its best interest to
do so under the rule of international law. In order to make this possi-
ble, September 11 has dictated that international law must grow and
adapt to meet changing needs in the global arena. Now that all eyes
are firmly placed on the United States in its War on Terrorism, the
United States should not increase international anarchy and lawless-
ness. Yet, at the same time, the United States seeks the freedom and
right to do what is in the best interest of U.S. national security. The
apparent shift in state practice currently underway has opened the
door to make this delicate balance of interests possible. Of course,
terrorism as a practice can never be completely eradicated. However,
that does not imply that the United States or the rest of the world
should sit idly by while a very real opportunity exists to significantly
dismantle the resources and systems upon which international ter-
rorists rely.
268 As Professor Wippman states,
The vigorous military response of the United States and its allies to the
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon reflect a broad inter-
pretation of the right of self-defense. The U.S. view of self-defense in this
context has been accepted by most States, though it would have generated
vigorous controversy if the assault on Afghanistan had taken place a dozen
years ago. This loosening of the constraints on the use of force may, within
limits, represent an inevitable and even desirable response to the changed
conditions following the Cold War. But we should be wary that the core
principles of the U.N. Charter's approach to the use of force are not too
rapidly and extensively eroded.
Wippman, supra note 256, at 145-46.
269 Bisone, supra note 154, at 114 (citation omitted).
270 Fidler, supra note 116, at 51.
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F. The Second Battlefield: Addressing the Root Causes of
Terrorism
Though not the focus of this Note, any analysis of the means and
methods of combating the scourge of international terrorism would
be incomplete without at least briefly mentioning the importance of
addressing the root causes of terrorism. The War on Terrorism is, in
actuality, a two-pronged war: one on the physical battlefield, and one
on the diplomatic battlefield.27' At the same time that the United
States defends itself with force, U.S. policymakers must make a con-
certed effort to take a revisionist look at U.S. foreign policy, rheto-
ric,2 72 engagements, and obligations 273 around the world, with an eye
toward curbing the disenchantment many in the Arab and Muslim
world feel toward the West.274 A recent Gallup poll illustrates the
271 To win the war on terrorism, one must therefore set two goals: first to de-
stroy the terrorists and, second, to begin a political effort that focuses on
the conditions that brought about their emergence.... To do so does not
imply propitiation of the terrorists, but is a necessary component of a strat-
egy designed to isolate and eliminate the terrorist underworld.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Confronting Anti-American Grievances, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 1, 2002, at WK9.
Furthermore, Moore states:
Countering terrorism requires seeing through the smoke to determine
what constitutes the threat and the best ways to mitigate those threats; the
integration of intelligence into diplomatic and military decision-making is cen-
tral ... Determination and patience, combined with proactive and dy-
namic application of social, economic, law enforcement, diplomatic,
intelligence, and military tools are the keys to disrupting and destroying
terrorist capacity and saving lives.
Moore, supra note 201, at 169-70.
272 Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski has brought to light the rhe-
torical failings of some U.S. policymakers following the September 11 attacks:
President Bush has wisely eschewed identifying terrorism with Islam as a
whole and [has] been careful to stress that Islam as such is not at fault. But
some supporters of the administration have been less careful about such
distinctions, arguing that Islamic culture in general is so hostile to the West,
and especially to democracy, that it has created a fertile soil for terrorist
hatred of America.
Brzezinski, supra note 271.
273 Concerning U.S. obligations, Professor Koh argues as follows:
To discourage states from harboring terrorists, we must use carrots, notjust
sticks, to support the law-abiding civil society groups who favor the demo-
cratic path in those countries. We need to work creatively, and on a people-
to-people basis, with foreign universities, nongovernmental organizations,
civil society groups, independent media, labor unions, women's groups,
and political parties to demonstrate to would-be terrorists that global free-
dom and cooperation are far more likely than global terrorism to engender
not just long-term prosperity, but genuine prospects for humane self-
government.
Koh, supra note 214, at 27 (citations omitted).
274 See Kelly, supra note 196, at 283 ("[W]e must struggle to understand the genesis of
the hatred harbored against our hegemony. Then we must adjust our policies accordingly
to pursue our national security priorities without unwittingly engendering further ill
will.").
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problem. 275 The poll, conducted by interviewing individuals from
nine Arab and Muslim nations to gauge public opinion in those coun-
tries after the September 11 attacks,276 found that the residents of the
nations polled had an unfavorable opinion of the United States by a 2-
to-i margin.277 Most respondents viewed the United States as "ruth-
less and arrogant" as well as "aggressive and biased against Islamic val-
ues." 278 They also described themselves as "resentful" of the United
States. 279 And while most respondents did not view the September 11
terrorist attacks as morally justified, even larger majorities condemned
the U.S.-led military action in Afghanistan as "morally
unjustifiable." 280
To counter these sentiments, the United States must initiate a
mutually beneficial dialogue to help foster better understanding be-
tween the West and the nations of the Arab and Muslim world. Only
with this understanding can the United States work towards eradicat-
ing the root causes of anti-American sentiment that prevail among
certain groups and lead to the breeding of international terrorists.281
In addition, the United States must make more of an effort to take
sincere interest in the problems facing those in the Arab and Muslim
world, 282 much like it does with its allies in Europe and elsewhere.2 3
And this interest must also be coupled with a reasonable level of inter-
national aid.
275 CNN.com, Poll: Muslims Call U.S. "Ruthless, Arrogant", CNN.com, at http://
www.cnn.com/2002/US/02/26/gallup.muslims/index.html (Feb. 26, 2002).
276 Id. ("Researchers conducted face-to-face interviews with 9,924 residents of Pakistan,
Iran, Indonesia, Turkey, Lebanon, Morocco, Kuwait, Jordan and Saudi Arabia ...
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 See Brzezinski, supra note 271 ("lilt is the emotional context of felt, observed or
historically recounted political grievances that shapes the fanatical pathology of terrorists
and eventually triggers their murderous actions.").
282 For example, Professor Kelly argues:
America and its allies must communicate to the Islamic world that the West
actually does care about its concerns. We must repeatedly point to past
actions undertaken to help Muslim countries: successful intervention in
Bosnia to defend Muslims against Serbian aggression, NATO bombing of
Serbia despite the absence of U.N. Security Council authorization to pro-
tect Muslim civilians in Kosovo .... Then we must translate this message
into reality on the ground in Kabul.
Kelly, supra note 196, at 287-88.
283 Missing from much of the [U.S.] public debate is discussion of the simple
fact that lurking behind every terroristic act is a specific political antece-
dent. That does not justify either the perpetrator or his political cause.
Nonetheless, the fact is that almost all terrorist activity originates from some
political conflict and is sustained by it as well. That is true of the Irish
Republican Army in Northern Ireland, the Basques in Spain, the Palestini-
ans in the West Bank and Gaza, the Muslims in Kashmir and so forth.
Brzezinski, supra note 271.
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The United States must also take steps through cooperation with
Arab and Muslim nations to end the constant vilification of the West
that permeates Arab and Muslim popular culture and media.28 4 And,
as Arab and Muslim views of U.S. society improve, U.S. efforts to seek
assistance from Arab and Muslim states in the War on Terrorism will
also go far in improving the U.S. view of Arab and Muslim society, as
the distinction between the majority Arab and Muslim population and
the minority groupings of radical Islamic fundamentalists becomes
more clear to those in the United States. In what is also of vital impor-
tance, the United States cannot now abandon Afghanistan to rebuild
on its own, as it did after the Soviet Union pullout in 1989.285 If the
United States were to do so it "would only be confirmation of the mi-
nority Islamic view: that America and the West are indifferent and self-
ishly concerned with pursuing their own interests. ' 28 6
Getting to the root causes of terrorism involves historical analysis
as well as addressing institutional problems-ones of entrenched hab-
its of foreign policy, diplomacy, and image-that can only be solved
over time with strong and enlightened leadership. Such leadership is
sorely needed from the United States as an essential piece of solving
the terrorism puzzle. 28 7 Without it, international terrorism will con-
tinue to grow even more prevalent and deadly.
G. The Struggle Against International Terrorism Should Be
Beyond Politics
Though this Note has, for obvious reasons, focused much atten-
tion on the words and deeds of the current Bush Administration, this
in no way suggests that the U.S. combat against international terror-
ism is a partisan issue. In fact, it is quite the contrary. Faced with the
realities of the post-September 11 world, every future U.S. presi-
dent-whether Democrat or Republican-will undoubtedly be re-
284 Kelly, supra note 196, at 289 ("[W] e must not continue to sit passively while inflam-
matory stories air on AIJezerra television allowing radical Muslims to cast us in the role of
the enemy.... We must espouse our values and ideals, but in a non-threatening, inclusive
manner." (citations omitted)).
285 See id. at 287; Moore, supra note 201, at 169.
286 Kelly, supra note 196, at 287.
287 Professor Kelly notes:
We must remember that the real enemy is hatred, and hatred is not de-
feated on the battlefield. It is conquered in the hearts and minds of the
people who harbor it. On September 11 th, the hearts of most of the world,
including the Islamic world, were with us. Now, the task is capturing the
minds as well. Today's active, reinvigorated education together with multi-
ple tangible demonstrations of empathy in place of yesterday's sentiment of
indifference and pervasive arrogance are essential components for attack-
ing the real enemy. Such effort takes a different kind of mind-set on our
part, and a more advanced strategy.
Id. at 292 (citation omitted).
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quired to place the battle against international terrorism high on his
or her priority list.288 The examples presented in Part II of this Note
illustrate this point, as presidents from both major U.S. political par-
ties responded with force against terrorist activities even before the
mandate of September 11.289 This underscores yet again the impor-
tance of the international terrorism exception to the proportionality
doctrine outlined in this Note: The U.S. global war against terror
must-if it is to be successful-be bigger than the particular president
that resides in the White House at any particular moment. Therefore,
the necessary rules of engagement must be carved out now so as to
avoid any lapses of intensity in the future.
It has already been demonstrated that the American public over-
whelmingly believes that combating international terrorism is a vital
goal of U.S. foreign policy. 290 In addition, the joint resolution author-
izing the use of U.S. armed forces against those responsible for the
attacks of September 11291 passed virtually unopposed in the United
States House of Representatives (with a vote of 420 to 1) 292 and passed
unanimously in the Senate (with a vote of 98 to 0).293 The ability of
international terrorists to commit such atrocities as perpetrated on
September 11 firmly united U.S. government officials from both sides
of the aisle behind the War on Terrorism. Such unity is a develop-
ment rarely seen during peacetime.
Indeed, before the mandate of September 11, U.S. uses of force
in response to terrorism on such a grand scale as the October 2001
intervention in Afghanistan would never have been permissible. 294
288 Cf Moore, supra note 201, at 169 ("[C]ountering terrorism is an ongoing process.
There is no victory or end game that signals the eradication of terrorism; it will remain a
fixture of human interaction. The objective is to use the best mix of available options to
save lives and mitigate the growth and effectiveness of terrorists.").
289 In fact, in the Clinton Administration's confrontations with international terror-
ism, President Clinton used rhetoric strikingly similar to that which is currently being used
by the Bush Administration, as demonstrated by the following comment made by Clinton
soon after the missile strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan:
My fellow Americans, our battle against terrorism did not begin with the
bombing of our embassies in Africa, nor will it end with today's strike. It
will require strength, courage and endurance. We will not yield to this
threat; we will meet it, no matter how long it may take. This will be a long,
ongoing struggle between freedom and fanaticism, between the rule of law
and terrorism. We must be prepared to do all that we can for as long as we must.
Clinton, supra note 144, at 1461.
290 See supra note 15.
291 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
292 147 CONG. REc. H5683 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001).
293 147 CONG. REc. S9421 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001).
294 See Wippman, supra note 256, at 145 (noting that "[t]he vigorous military response
of the United States and its allies to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Penta-
gon reflect[s] a broad interpretation of the right to self-defense," and that "the U.S. view of
self-defense in this context has been accepted by most States, though it would have generated
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For example, imagine if the Clinton Administration had reliable and
credible information regarding Osama bin Laden's whereabouts after
the embassy bombings in 1998, but the only reliable way to capture or
kill him would have been to invade Afghanistan with U.S. troops.
Would President Clinton have been able to embark on that mission?
It is highly unlikely that he would have been allowed the freedom to
implement such an overt use of force. After September 11, however,
if a president were provided with such valuable information on bin
Laden's whereabouts, then he or she would be expected to act in a
manner sufficient to achieve that mission. 295
History has shown the United States that cruise missile strikes and
solitary bombing runs are ineffective measures in combating interna-
tional terrorism: terrorists on the run can disappear quickly and qui-
etly, and destroyed training camps can easily be rebuilt or relocated.
Targets such as bin Laden and his al Qaeda terrorist network require
much more intense uses of force and multi-faceted counter-efforts to
be disrupted and defeated. The emerging shift in state practice re-
garding the relaxation of the rules regulating self-defensive actions
against international terrorist threats has made such efforts possible.
However, with this massive grant of authority comes the responsibility
to wield it prudently. Therefore, policymakers from both major U.S.
political parties should unite to clarify and refine the practice of the
proportionality exception for the general good of both U.S. national
security and global peace and security.
CONCLUSION
The men and women of our Armed Forces have delivered a message now clear
to every enemy of the United States: Even 7,000 miles away, across oceans
and continents, on mountaintops and in caves, you will not escape the jus-
tice of this Nation.
-President George W. Bush296
September 11 taught the United States that it can no longer dis-
count the reach, fervor, persistence, determination, and deadly poten-
tial of international terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda.
International terrorist networks are no longer far-away entities operat-
ing only in foreign lands, so it no longer makes sense to ignore them
vigorous controversy if the assault on Afghanistan had taken place a dozen years ago" (emphasis
added)).
295 In fact, President Clinton recently expressed that he is "full of regret" that his Ad-
ministration did not stop Osama bin Laden before the September 11 terrorist attacks. See
Clinton 'Full of Regret' Bin Laden Got Away, CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/
09/03/clinton.bin.laden/index.html (Sept. 4, 2002) (quoting Clinton as stating during an
interview with CNN's Larry King, "I thought that my virtual obsession with [bin Laden] was
well placed, and I was full of regret that I didn't get him.").
296 President's State of the Union Address, supra note 14, at 134.
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and let them strengthen. Therefore, under what logical paradigm
should the United States be forced to accept the continued potent
existence of such groups, when it has at its disposal the means and will
to combat them? That being said, because the U.S. War on Terrorism
will undoubtedly set an important precedent with an equally impor-
tant impact on the international rules regulating the use of force, an
open and honest explanation of the unfurling U.S. terrorism doctrine
is badly needed. This is not a bombing run over Tripoli; this is sus-
tained and comprehensive combat against a vast global enemy.
If the United States is to wage its war on global terror, Article 51
of the U.N. Charter-a document drafted over fifty years ago without
knowledge of the destructive power now available to modern-day in-
ternational terrorist organizations-must be reinterpreted to include
an exception to the proportionality limitation on the right to self-de-
fense relating specifically to combating international terrorism. This
reinterpretation is being dictated by the current shift in state practice
which supports U.S. uses of force in the aftermath of September 11,
creating a new customary international legal norm. If the U.N. Char-
ter and international law are to be effective in promoting the objective
of international peace and security, they must be malleable to the
ever-changing international climate. If the Charter cannot bend and
adapt to this situation, then it will prove itself ineffective in addressing
hostile situations beyond the scope of those its drafters had in mind
when they put pen to paper. This result will not bode well for the
efficacy of the U.N. Charter system in the modern world. Further-
more, such an outcome would force the United States to continue
concocting strained arguments in its effort to justify its actions as fall-
ing within the permissible bounds of the U.N. Charter. If the United
States remains complacent with that route, then it must expect other
states to follow in those convenient footsteps, justifying uses of force
far in excess of the threats they face.
It is important to note that even under the revised proportional-
ity doctrine to combat international terrorism, certain fundamental
limits must be adhered to in every U.S. use of force. First, all uses of
force must continue to adhere to the rules of armed conflict, includ-
ing the protection of civilians and the ban on certain impermissible
methods of warfare. 297 Next, the United States may not use force
against a target unless it has reliable and credible evidence of interna-
tional terrorist activity connected with that target. Lastly, the propor-
tionality exception in the name of self-defense post-September 11
cannot be used as an excuse by the United States to topple legitimate
government regimes all over the globe. The level of support by the
297 See supra note 198.
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Taliban for the al Qaeda in Afghanistan appears to be an isolated ex-
ample. These limitations do not and should never change. The ex-
ception is not a blank check, and should not be viewed by the United
States in that way.
In this new era and in the new fight against the deadly and highly
effective forces of global terrorism, U.S. policymakers have an obliga-
tion to ensure that the United States does not remain under the veiled
and constant threat of terrorism for any longer than necessary. Quite
simply, the United States can no longer exchange "tit-for-tat" hostili-
ties with terrorists. 298 However, history will no doubtjudge the United
States more kindly if it clearly defines its actions in its defense, and
asks the world community for its support.
This Note does not intend to promote international hostilities.
Rather, it is an attempt to find the appropriate and workable balance
between avoiding international anarchy and allowing the United
States the freedom to act whenever it is justified and necessary to do
so. In order to do this without degrading the entire international le-
gal system, the norms regulating the use of self-defense in response to
international terrorism must be altered. It has been stated,
The events of 11 September have set in motion a significant loosen-
ing of the legal constraints on the use of force, and this in turn will
lead to changes across the international legal system. Only time will
tell whether these changes to international law are themselves a nec-
essary and proportionate response to the shifting threats of an all
too dangerous world.299
These words must be tempered with the following admonition:
September 11 does indeed seem to have been the end and the begin-
ning of an era, and the international legal landscape will certainly now
change. However, as the United States is freed to assert the many
facets of its power around the globe in the name of the War on Ter-
rorism, the most definite way to ensure that the terrorists succeed in
destroying international peace and security is for the United States to
sit idly by as time take its toll on the U.N. Charter system's ability to
regulate international uses of force.
298 For example, the 1986 Libyan bombing and the 1998 cruise missile strikes against
Afghanistan and Sudan.
299 Byers, supra note 192, at 414 (emphasis added).
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